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American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity To Reshape
Sports Law
A BS TRA C T. In American Needle v. NationalFootballLeague, the U.S. Supreme Court will
decide whether, and to what extent, section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act regulates a
professional sports league and its independently owned franchises. For the first time, the Court
could characterize a league and its teams as a single entity, meaning that the league and its teams
are not able to "conspire" because they share one "corporate consciousness," and thus cannot
violate section 1 through even the most anticompetitive behaviors. Such an outcome would run
counter to the sports league-related decisions of most U.S. Courts of Appeals, which have
generally rejected the single entity defense because teams often do not pursue common interests.
It would, however, prove consistent with the views of the Seventh Circuit, which in 2008
determined in American Needle that the National Football League and its teams constitute a
single entity for purposes of apparel sales.
This Feature provides a substantive analysis ofAmerican Needle, the relationship between
antitrust law and professional sports, and the merits and weaknesses of the single entity defense
for professional sports leagues and their teams. The Feature also projects how American Needle
may influence the legal strategies and business operations of other sports associations.
The Feature discourages the Court from recognizing the NFL and similar leagues as single
entities, and recommends that Congress consider targeted, sports-related exemptions from
section i.

A U T H O R. Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; Legal Analyst and SI.com
Columnist, Sports Illustrated; Co-founder, Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law
School; Distinguished Visiting Hall of Fame Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of
Law. I thank Christopher Lund, Gregory Bowman, Gordon Hylton, Geoffrey Rapp, Peter
Teachout, Pamela Stephens, Jason Czarnezki, John Greabe, Renee Jones, Brian Quinn, Marc
Edelman, Gabriel Feldman, Nathaniel Grow, Alfred Yen, Rick Karcher, Philip Meyer, Ryan
Rodenberg, Warren Zola, Judge (Ret.) John Fenton, and participants in faculty workshops at
Vermont Law School and Boston College Law School for their outstanding thoughts, comments,
and insights, and Patrick Malloy and Jacob Struck for their excellent research assistance. I am
similarly grateful to The Yale Law Journal staff, and in particular Alex Kardon, for their
outstanding work on this piece. I also thank my parents, brother, and sisters for all of their
encouragement over the years. As a disclosure, I served as counsel to Maurice Clarett in Clarettv.
NationalFootballLeague, 369 F. 3 d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), his lawsuit against the National Football
League and its eligibility rule.
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INTRODUCTION

This Feature will explore American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League1
and its potential impact on professional sports in the United States. In August
2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
National Football League (NFL) and its teams operate as a "single entity" for
purposes of apparel sales.2 Because a single entity cannot conspire with itself, it
cannot violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits concerted action
that unreasonably restrains trade.' The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted a
writ of certiorari and will review American Needle in its 2009 Term.4
As this Feature will detail, American Needle presents the most meaningful
sports law controversy in recent memory.' For the first time, a U.S. court of
appeals has expressly recognized that in certain settings of collusive behavior, a
professional sports league and its independently owned franchises may
function as a single entity. American Needle offers the Supreme Court an
opportunity to settle a longstanding source of confusion: how should antitrust
law regulate the peculiar, perhaps incomparable, business entity known as a
professional sports league?
The stakes could not be higher. If the Supreme Court agrees with the
Seventh Circuit or, as the NFL hopes, furnishes an even more sweeping
recognition of single entity status, professional sports leagues could be shielded
from section i in a bevy of decisionmaking contexts that have traditionally been
subject to section 1 scrutiny. Particularly when compared to their past
treatment, leagues could become uniquely sovereign and commanding.6
This Feature will begin by describing the litigants in American Needle and
the underlying relationship between antitrust law and the NFL. The Feature

1.

538 F. 3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).

2.

Id. at 743-44.

3.

Sherman Antitrust Act S 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see 538 F. 3 d at 744.

4-

Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (mem.).

s.

Other prominent sports law cases, which help form a foundation from which to study
American Needle, include: Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); National Hockey League PlayersAss'n v.
Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F. 3d 462 (6th Cir. 2005); Fraserv. Major League Soccer,

L.L.C., 284 F. 3 d 47 (1st Cir. 2002); Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnershipv. National
Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996); and North American Soccer League v. National
FootballLeague, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).

6.

As single entities, leagues would remain subject to other sources of antitrust law, most
notably section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolistic behavior. Sherman
Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. S 2 (2006). Single entity status would nonetheless prove
meaningful since antitrust actions brought against leagues are typically based on section i.

AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL

will then turn to a substantive analysis of American Needle and its implications
for the NFL and other organized sports associations, including the National
Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), the National
Hockey League (NHL), and the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA). Single entity recognition may benefit these organizations when they
negotiate television contracts, restrain players' salaries and employment
autonomy, and execute exclusive contracts with sponsors and licensees, among
other pursuits traditionally subject to section 1 scrutiny. This Feature will
conclude with a recommendation that the Court reject the NFL's single entity
defense on the grounds that it would belie legal precedent and mistakenly
characterize league operations. The recommendation, however, will leave open
the door for leagues to pursue, and for Congress to consider, targeted
exemptions from section 1.
I.

OF AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL, RELATED
AND APPLICATIONS TO THE NFL AND
PRINCIPLES,
ANTITRUST
AN OVERVIEW

PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

A. American Needle and Its Parties
Although American Needle illuminates deep tensions between professional
sports league behavior and customary expectations of antitrust law, it concerns
a mere contractual dispute over caps, visors, and other headwear.
The plaintiff, American Needle, Inc., is an apparel corporation with a
lengthy record in sports. Since 1918,' American Needle has attracted customers
ranging from sports apparel retailers to ballpark concessionaires and has served
9
as a licensee of MLB and the NHL.' It has also served as a licensee of the NFL.
From the late 1970s to 2000, American Needle maintained a nonexclusive
license to design and manufacture headgear bearing logos and names of the
NFL and its franchises. During that time, American Needle competed with
other licensees that sold similarly licensed NFL headgear."

7.

See Am. Needle & Novelty, Inc. v. Drew Pearson Mktg., No. 92 C 6649, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 161, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1993) (stating that American Needle was founded in
1918).

8.

See Am. Needle & Novelty, Inc. v. Drew Pearson Mktg., 820 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (furnishing background on American Needle).

9.

Id.

lo.

Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 ( 7 th Cir. 2008).
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American Needle's principal defendant, the NFL, is more familiar. Since
1920, it has existed as an unincorporated 5o1(c)(6) association of separately
owned and operated franchises (more commonly referred to as "teams") of
varying legal types (franchises are generally corporations, partnerships, or sole
proprietorships) that compete in games and in ancillary components of those
games, such as the hiring of players, coaches, and staff." Although the NFL has
periodically competed with rival professional football leagues, 12 it
unquestionably represents the dominant professional football league across the
globe.3

The NFL would not exist but for its teams, of which there are now thirtytwo. These teams must compete in order to generate competitive football. Less
obviously, they necessarily collaborate, too. They agree on game rules, for
instance; if teams disagreed as to whether a first down requires ten yards or
fifteen yards of advancement, they could not play each other.14
NFL teams also agree on matters that may not require collaboration but
nonetheless yield greater efficiencies through collaboration. Intellectual

11. See Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 775 (3 d Cir. 1983) (identifying
the NFL as a not-for-profit business that qualifies for federal income tax exemption under
§ 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code); see also Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the
Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 751, 756-57 (1989) (explaining the basic characteristics
of the NFL and NFL franchises).
See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339,
12.
407-08 (discussing the NFL's rivals). The United Football League (UFL), which began play
in fall 2009, may present a new rival, though its aspirations appear relatively modest, with
an apparent interest in pursuing ex-NFL players and those unable to gain NFL employment.
See Doug Hailer, UpstartLeague Moves Forward,ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 17, 2009, at C7. U.S.
professional football leagues that have succeeded financially have avoided direct competition
with the NFL; the Arena Football League, at least until recent financial woes, was the
paradigmatic example. See Michael Arace, Misguided Ideas Led to Sad Demise of AFL,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 20o9, at C1.
13. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F. 3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing additional
background on the NFL's dominance); U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 842
F.2d 1335, 1343-45 (2d Cir. 1988) (recounting the history of professional football leagues).

Empirical data also capture the NFL's market dominance. The NFL nets more from the sale
of broadcasting rights than the NBA, NHL, MLB, and the National Association for Stock
Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) combined. See Peter Grant & Adam Thompson, Gridiron
Clash: NFL Network Gets Blocked as Cable Takes Tough Stance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2007, at
Ai. More starkly put, the NFL nets more in the sale of broadcasting rights than over fifty
countries produce annually in Gross Domestic Product. See Ross C. Paolino, Upon Further
Review: How NFL Network Is Violating the Sherman Act, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 3 (2009).

14. Technically, teams could play each other in spite of such disagreement, but the rules for each
game would have to be separately negotiated, which would presumably impose unworkable
transaction costs.

AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL

property is one such matter. Although each team preserves separate ownership
of its team-based intellectual property (also known as "club marks," which
include team names, logos, helmet designs, uniform insignias, and identifying
slogans) and retains limited autonomy to license such property for6 game day
5
promotions and local advertising," the teams otherwise collaborate.'
Specifically, since 1963, NFL teams have utilized National Football League
Properties (NFLP), a separate entity entrusted with the development,
production, and contracting of teams' intellectual property rights. 7 Each NFL
team owns an equal share in NFLP and appoints one of its board of directors'
thirty-two members, with NFLP action usually contingent upon a majority
vote. 8 Although teams' intellectual properties generate varying levels of sales,
NFLP income is evenly distributed among the teams." This distribution is

technically made by the NFL Trust, a separate entity which was created by
NFL owners and which possesses an exclusive licensing agreement with
NFLP.2 ° Essentially, the NFL Trust receives the NFLP's licensing revenue,
distributes some of it to charities, subtracts fees and expenses, and distributes
to each team an equal share of the net profits.2"
NFLP was formed during an evolutionary era for the NFL during which
NFL teams became more synergetic. 2 Pete Rozelle, commissioner of the NFL
from 1960 to 1989, shepherded the league through this transformative period.
Rozelle surmised that the NFL's future depended on every NFL owner -from

iS.

See MARK CONRAD, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS: A PRIMER FOR JOURNALISTS 270 (2oo6).

16.

See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League,
129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (No. o8-661), 2009 WL 1497823; see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, The MerchandisingRight: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 472

17.

n.41 (2005) (discussing the creation of National Football League Properties (NFLP) in the
broader context of merchandising rights).
This basic arrangement was reaffirmed in 1983, when the teams entered into a trust
agreement, which provided that each team transfer the exclusive right to use its club marks.
The trust in turn licensed those rights to NFLP. See Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v.
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 922 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

i.
19.

See Oakland Raiders v. Nat'l Football League, 93 Cal. App. 4 th 572, 579

2o.

See Nat'l FootballLeague Props., 922 F. Supp. at 851.

21.

See ECON. RESEARCH AssoCs., ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS FOR THE PROPOSED NFL
STADIUM IN ARLINGTON, TEXAS 27 (2004), available at http://www.ci.arlington.tx.us/pdf/

(2001).

See CONRAD, supra note 15, at 270.

ERA%2oStudy/.2oFinal.pdf.
22.

The willingness of NFL owners to entrust their club marks partly reflected fear of the
American Football League. See Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options To Redress Anticompetitive
Restraints and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
133, 162 (2001).
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the wealthiest and most profitable to the neediest and most owing -perceiving
his or her equity stake as vitally interconnected, with one team's economic
failure threatening all others. 3 In time, Rozelle persuaded owners that the NFL
would be most prosperous if significant portions of teams' resources were
collectivized and if significant portions of their profits were equally
distributed.' 4
A national television contract, whereby the NFL would bundle all teams'
broadcasting rights into one contract, the fruits of which would be equally
distributed among the teams, served as the hallmark of Rozelle's ideology.2"
Despite vast differences in local television ratings and corresponding television
revenue, Rozelle convinced owners that through a national contract, they
would ultimately obtain more revenue. 6 By any logical measure, the last fortyfive years have proven Rozelle categorically correct, both in terms of television
revenue 27 and of his central thesis that sharing would benefit teams.8

23.

See David Harris, Pete Rozelle: The Man Who Made Football an American Obsession, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1984, S 6 (Magazine), at 12 ("[1Rozelle] persuaded his employers that the key
to marketing the N.F.L.'s product was maintaining a consistently high level of competition
among all the clubs, a goal that could best be reached by limiting the clubs' competition off
the field. If each franchise were left to shift for its financial self, Rozelle argued, the ensuing
division into rich and poor would give a few teams enormous advantages. This would create
a corresponding imbalance on the field, greatly lessening the attractiveness of the league as a
whole. In the long run, that would cost everyone money.").

a4. See Clay Moorhead, Note, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL: Perfecting the
Balance Between NFL Socialism and UnrestrainedFree-Trade, 3 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 641,
642-43 (2006).
2S. See Gary R. Roberts, The Legality of the Exclusive Collective Sale of Intellectual PropertyRights
by Sports Leagues, 3 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 52, 56-57 (2001).
26. See John Helyar, Labor Peace Threatened by Rift Between Owners, ESPN.COM, Mar. 6, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/storyid=2354095; see also Harris, supra note 23
(describing how Rozelle convinced owners that in the long run, a "division into rich and
poor [owners] ... would cost everyone money").
27.
Consider that in 1962, CBS agreed to pay the NFL $4.65 million per year for the bundled
package of all NFL games. See Moorhead, supra note 24, at 647-48. This would equate to
roughly $33 million in today's dollars. See Purchasing Power of Money in the United States
from 1774 to 2008, MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measuringworth.com/ppowerus
(last visited Nov. 9, 2009). Currently, the NFL generates more than $3 billion a year from
broadcasting rights, which comprise more than half of the league's total revenue. See Ethan
Flatt, Note, Solidifying the Defensive Line: The NFL Network's Current Position UnderAntitrust
Law and How It Can Be Improved, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 637, 639 (2009). In addition,
the NFL's net worth of approximately $12.8 billion is nearly double that of Major League
Baseball, the league with the second-highest worth. Id.
28. See, e.g., ECON. RESEARCH Assocs., supra note 21, at 20 (describing the considerable increase
in franchise values since 1974).

AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL

By collectively licensing teams' intellectual property in bundled packages,
NFLP could have taken a similar approach to the national television contract.
For many years, however, NFLP opted for a more dispersed mode of
distribution. Indeed, until 2001, NFLP sold nonexclusive licensing rights to
multiple apparel companies, including American Needle.' 9 In some cases, these
apparel companies would work with individual teams on the design of
apparel.3 0 The approach generated substantial profits for NFLP in the 198os,
but struggled in the mid-to-late 199os, when more companies entered the
sports apparel market and the Dallas Cowboys sought licensing independence
from NFLP. 3
Amid NFLP's struggles, the NFL hired apparel expert Chuck Zona to
restructure NFLP's approach to licensing, including in the context of apparel.
Zona concluded that NFLP had executed licensing agreements with too many
apparel companies, which in turn sold too many products to too many stores,
thereby creating an "inventory glut," with NFL-licensed apparel lacking a core
identity.3 2 Put another way, NFL-licensed apparel did not seem special.
To rectify itself, NFLP needed to - as Zona put it - "create the dynamic of
supply and demand,"33 meaning, in effect, price and produce like a monopolist
rather than like a competing firm. To achieve that, NFLP awarded its apparel
license to one company, Reebok, which paid $250 million in 2002 for an
exclusive ten-year contract.3 4 NFLP believed the exclusive contract would
strengthen NFLP control over apparel sales and offer enhanced opportunities
for long-term business strategies.3 " It would also remove opportunities for
idiosyncratic arrangements between individual teams and nonexclusive
companies. s6
NFLP's relationship with American Needle ended when NFLP entered into
the exclusive contract with Reebok. Four years later, American Needle filed a

29.

Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 385 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (N.D. Iln. 2005) ("For

many years, American Needle and other clothing manufacturers were licensed by the NFLP
to use NFL teams' trademarks on their headwear and apparel.").
30. See MARK YOST, TAILGATING, SACKS, AND SALARY CAPS 128 (2006) (describing how each
NFL team worked with a licensee "on uniforms, practice wear, and sideline apparel").
31. Id. at 126; Christine Brennan, Cowboys'Jones Sues League, NFL Propertiesfor $750 Million,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1995, at D6 (discussing legal efforts by Dallas Cowboys' owner Jerry
Jones to extricate Cowboys' licensing from NFLP requirements).
32.

YOST, supra note 30, at

33.

Id. at

34.

Id. at 1z8.

127.

3S. Id. at 128-29.
36. Id.

126-27.
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lawsuit against the NFL, NFLP, and Reebok, asserting that the defendants'
exclusive contract violated section 1.17 American Needle's core claim was
straightforward: because each NFL team preserved ownership of its intellectual
property, the defendants violated section 1 by conspiring, through NFLP, to
restrict the ability of vendors such as American Needle to obtain licenses in
teams' intellectual property."
After limited discovery, the NFL persuaded U.S. District Judge James
Moran to grant summary judgment.3 9 Judge Moran reasoned that NFLP, the
NFL, and NFL teams "have so integrated their operations [with respect to
40
intellectual property rights] that they should be deemed to be a single entity."
A three-judge panel on the Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed, with
Judge Michael Kanne drafting the opinion.41 In concluding that the NFL and
its teams constitute a single entity for the limited purpose of licensing, Judge
Kanne highlighted the voluntary choice of teams to assign the licensing of their
club marks to the league-controlled NFLP. Judge Kanne declined to expressly
limit the scope of single entity recognition to the NFL's licensing, however,
meaning that the NFL, as well as other professional leagues and possibly the
NCAA, could potentially enjoy single entity status in nonlicensing activities,
such as regulating franchise relocation, using league-owned cable channels to
control viewership of games, and instituting salary scales and salary limits for
players.

42

In a unique stroke, both the losing American Needle and the prevailing
NFL requested that the Supreme Court grant review.43 Successful appellants
seldom seek Court review, yet the NFL believed the Court would supply a
farther-reaching decision in its favor. Other leagues felt similarly: both the

37.

Reebok initially responded to the lawsuit by questioning American Needle's decision to wait

four years to file a claim. See Steve Adams, Suit Calls NFL, Reebok Deal a Monopoly, PATRIOT
LEDGER, Jan. 27, 2005, at 35. It is unclear why American Needle waited four years, though it
was within its statutory rights to do so.
38. There was a second claim based on section 2 of the Sherman Act. This Feature does not
address the second claim, which is outside the scope of the single entity defense.
39. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Il. 2007).
Id. at 943.
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7 th Cir. 2008).
42. See id. at 742.
43. American Needle filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, while the NFL's request came in its
brief in response to American Needle. Reebok-the other defendant-waived its
opportunity to file a brief.
40.
41.

AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL

NBA and the NHL filed amicus briefs in support of the NFL.' The Court
showed interest, inviting then-Acting Solicitor General Ed Kneedler to file a
brief expressing the views of the United States.45 Kneedler was replaced by
Elena Kagan when she was confirmed as Solicitor General, and Kagan filed the
requested brief, recommending that the Court decline certiorari. Kagan
surmised that while the Seventh Circuit's reasoning "is in some tension with
this Court's precedents ...

its holding does not conflict with any decision of

this Court or another court of appeals.,, 6 The Court nonetheless granted
certiorari, setting the stage for a landmark decision.
B. CoreAntitrust Principles Underpinningthe NFL
The Supreme Court will decide whether, and to what extent, the NFL
comprises a single entity. As a single entity, a professional sports league and its
independently owned franchises would obtain a complete exemption from
section 1.Section 1is widely considered one of the most important tools of U.S.
federal antitrust law, a body of law born during the Industrial Revolution as a
4
means to curb anticompetitive combinations of powerful competitors and
primarily designed to maximize total societal wealth, efficiency, and consumer
welfare. 4 8 Section 1 principally aims to prevent competitors from combining

44. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l Basketball Ass'n & NBA Props. in Support of the NFL

Respondents' Response, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009)
(No. o8-661), 2009 WL 164243; Brief for Amicus Curiae the Nat'l Hockey League in
Support of the NFL Respondents, Am. Needle, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (No. o8-661), 2009 WL
164244.

45. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 129 S.Ct. 1400 (2009).
46.

47.

48.

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 16, at 14.
See Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics ofLaw and Economics in JudicialDecision Making: Antitrust as
a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 563-66 (1986) (noting that the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(20o6), was the first of three key pieces of federal antitrust legislation, with the Clayton Act
in 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 5253), and the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the merger section of the Clayton Act in 1950,
Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 15U.S.C. §§ 18, 21),

serving as the other two pieces); see also J. Gordon Christy, A Prolegomenato Federal Statutory
Interpretation:Identifying the Sources of Interpretive Problems, 76 Miss. L.J. 55, 81-82 (2006)
(discussing the limitations of congressional foresight as to how the Sherman Act would be
applied by courts). See generally Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (discussing the political dynamics that led to passage
of the Sherman Act).
See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984); see also Einer
Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 702 (1991) (noting
the existence of social, economic, and distributive purposes of federal antitrust law); Elbert
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their economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm
consumers, be it in terms of increased prices, diminished quality, limited
49
choices, or impaired technological progress.
The NFL has a fifty-year history of defending section 1 claims, 0 with
litigated topics including the league's capacity to prohibit NFL owners from
relocating their franchises without league approval' and to financially dissuade
NFL teams from signing players whose contracts with other teams had
expired. 2 Pending American Needle's ultimate resolution, the NFL currently
remains susceptible to section 1 challenges in many of its business endeavors.
Any challenge would prompt one of two standards of review.
Per se analysis, the more common standard for certain kinds of section 1
violations,"3 is a streamlined approach for when a restraint reveals a
"predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect." 4 Such a restraint is

L. Robertson, A CorrectiveJustice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, 49 CATH.U. L. REV. 741, 782
(20o0) (acknowledging that efficiency-based analysis serves as a leading paradigm for
contemporary antitrust regulation). The Sherman Act's legislative history suggests
secondary rationales, including concern that American democracy would be threatened by
one business obtaining too much power. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Morality andAntitrust,
2006 COLUM. Bus.

L. REv. 443, 478.

49. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984); Northrop
Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1050 ( 9 th Cit. 1983); see also ROBERT H.
BoRK,THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50-56 (1978) (outlining the

economic implications of the primary goals of section 1);Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principlesand Collective Bargainingby Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage,
81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971) (discussing the relationship between the goals of antitrust law and
professional sports).
so. The modern era of section i litigation for the NFL began with United States v. NFL, 116 F.
Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), which prohibited league restrictions on television and radio
broadcasts of games.
5i. See, e.g., L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9 th Cit.
1984).
52.

53.

See, e.g., Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (invalidating as
anticompetitive the "Rozelle Rule," which required any NFL team that signed a player who
was previously employed by another NFL team to financially compensate the previously
employing team).
Price-fixing agreements, for instance, are normally considered per se illegal. See In re Baby
Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 ( 3 d Cit. 1999).

54. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); see also Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985) (noting that a group boycott is a per se

violation of the Sherman Act); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351
(1982) (finding fee agreements among physicians to be price fixing).
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presumed to violate section 1 and illegality follows regardless of procompetitive
effects or motives."
Rule of reason analysis, in contrast, involves a fact-intensive inquiry
whereby an agreement or restraint is deemed unlawful only if it causes an
anticompetitive injury that outweighs procompetitive effects." The balancing
of anticompetitive and procompetitive considerations usually requires a court
to scrutinize the degree of collusion associated with the restraint as well as the
restraint's rationales, history, and impact on the relevant market.5 7 Rule
of
8
venturesi
joint
including
restraints,
of
types
certain
for
reason is favored
Considering that per se analysis tends to advantage plaintiffs while rule of
reason typically favors defendants,"9 professional sports league defendants,
when subjected to section 1 analysis, prefer rule of reason. In most section 1
cases, they have received it. Courts have repeatedly adopted rule of reason for
scrutinizing restraints imposed by professional sports leagues, in part because
of a general trend toward such analysis and away from per se condemnation,"
and in part because those leagues and their independently owned franchises
have been viewed, at least until American Needle, as joint ventures.6i
The concept of joint venture is crucial to understanding the controversy
and significance of American Needle. Joint ventures are associations of "two or
more persons formed to carry out a single business enterprise for profit for

55.

MaricopaCounty Med. Socy, 457 U.S. at 351.

56.

See Gordon H. Copland & Pamela E. Hepp, Government Antitrust Enforcement in the Health
Care Markets: The Regulators Need an Update, 99 W. VA. L. REv. l1, lO6-07 (1996).

s.

See Five Smiths, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 788 F. Supp.

Minn.

1992)

1042,

1045 (D.
692

(quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,

(1978)).

See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F. 3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008).
sg. See Edward D. Cavanagh, DetreblingAntitrust Damages:An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61
TUL. L. REV. 777, 826-29 (1987) (discussing how per se analysis advantages plaintiffs);
Recent Cases, 11o HARv. L. REv. 523, 527 (1996) ("[R]ule of reason analysis heavily favors
defendants ....
").
6o. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 427, 458
(1995); Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust
Method, 8o VA. L. REv. 577, 6o5 (1994) (discussing the history of the application of rule of
reason and per se analysis).
61. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3 d lO91, 1O99 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem'l
Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9 th Cir. 1984); N. Am.
Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Levin v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 385 F.
Supp. 149, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Courts' unfamiliarity with sports practices may also explain
their unwillingness to apply per se analysis. See Richard E. Bartok, Note, NFL FreeAgency
58.

Restrictions UnderAntitrustAttack, 1991 DuKE L.J. 503, 507

n.27.
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which purpose they combine their property, money, effects, skill, and
knowledge. ''62 Examples of joint ventures include professional associations,
stock exchanges, and credit card networks.6 3
In applying rule of reason to a joint venture, courts typically assess the
extent to which the joint venture deprives the marketplace of the independent
decisionmaking normally demanded by competition and, conversely, the extent
to which the joint venture improves market efficiencies. 6 4 Courts usually have
found joint ventures to satisfy rule of reason analysis on the basis that rather
than harming consumers' interests, joint ventures often provide consumers
not have been produced or
with new product offerings that otherwise would
6
would not have been produced as efficiently. ,
Until American Needle, the NFL had repeatedly been regarded as a joint
venture of individually owned football franchises and thus subjected to rule of
reason. 66 This reasoning makes sense. The product of NFL football necessarily
requires multiple NFL teams and therefore requires agreement between teams
on how NFL football should be produced. Teams work together to create,
define, and limit the means of competition in order to advance themselves and
the league. When acting in concert or "jointly," teams also reserve power over
the league itself. For instance, the highest-ranking league official - the
commissioner -must be approved by twenty-two of the thirty-two ownership
groups and can be removed from office by those same owners.67

62.

46 AM. JUR. 2Djoint Ventures § 1 (20o6).

63. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A ProposedAntitrust Approach to CollaborationsAmong Competitors,
86 IOWAL. REV. 1137, 1173 (2001).
64. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (describing the evolution
of the rule of reason and explaining the rule's focus on the competitive significance of a
restraint); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 77 (applying the rule of reason to price variations among industries).
65.

See Derek Devgun,

Crossborder Joint Ventures: A

Survey

of International Antitrust

Considerations,21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 681, 69o-91 (1996) (discussing how joint ventures
may capitalize off of economies of scale and other constructs to supply a more competitive
market); F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering
Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 47 B.C. L. REv. 111, 135 (2007) (noting the success of
joint ventures under rule of reason).
66. See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cit. 1982)
(expressly labeling the NFL and its franchises as a "joint venture"); cf. Mackey v. Nat'l
Football League, 543 F.2d 6o6, 619 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he NFL assumes some of the
characteristics of a joint venture. .. ").
67. See Morris v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 1013, io16 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (citing NFL
CONST. art. VIII, § 8.1) (noting that NFL owners "shall select and employ the
Commissioner and shall determine his period of employment and his compensation"); Alan
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While necessarily collaborators for purposes of supplying competitive
football, NFL teams, like those in the NBA, MLB, and NHL, remain distinct
legal entities with individualized ownerships. In their individualized capacities,
teams enjoy autonomy over ticket prices, stadium leases, and equipment
purchases. 68 Within agreed-upon settings, most notably with regard to a salary
floor and salary cap on team payrolls, teams also possess autonomy over

personnel and salary decisions concerning players, coaches, and
administrators. 69 Also, while they share approximately ninety percent of their

total revenue," ° teams do not share all forms of revenue, 7' just as they do not
share their profits, losses, or tax obligations. 72 Teams retain revenue generated
by local advertising, local radio, televised broadcasts of preseason games,
stadium naming, luxury boxes, club seats, and other increasingly lucrative,
location-specific sources. 73 Not surprisingly, teams generate considerably
74
different amounts of annual revenue and likewise possess varying net worth.
Though teams act jointly to regulate the NFL, they also agree to partially
insulate the NFL from themselves. For instance, the NFL's central office (or
"headquarters") -which consists of officials employed by the NFL and not by

Abrahamson, Goodell Is Chosen as NFL Chief, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9,
voting process for election of the commissioner).

2006,

at Di (noting the

68. Goldman, supra note ii, at 763.
69. Id.

70. See Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: Relevant Product Market Definition in Sports
FranchiseRelocation Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 254 n.48.
71. See Ian Dobson, The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota Vikings' Failure To Understand
Minnesota's Values Dooms Their Proposalfor a New Stadium and How the Team Can Improve Its
Future Chances, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 485, 491-92 (2006).
72. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 ( 9 th Cit.
1984) (discussing how teams do not share profits or losses); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of
the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications
of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1983) (noting the tax consequences of
teams' separate profits and losses).
73. See Helyar, supra note 26; see also Mark Curnutte, The 'Haves' vs. the 'Have-Mores,'
CINCINNATI ENQUiRER, Feb. 25, 2007, at Cio ("The higher rate of growth in unshared
revenue generated by teams with new stadiums in larger markets has created disparity.");
Kurt Badenhausen, Michael K. Ozanian & Christina Settimi, The Richest Game,
FORBES.COM, Sept. 1O, 2008, http://www.forbes.coM/2o8/o9/lo/nfl-team-valuations-biz
-sports-nflo8 cz kb-mo-o91onfl-land.html (describing the loss of stadium-related revenue
for teams unable to secure new stadiums).
74. See NFL Team Valuations, FORBES.COM, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/
lists/2oo9/3o/football-values-o9_NFL-Team-ValuationsValue.html (indicating values of
all thirty-two franchises, with the Dallas Cowboys ($1.65 billion) and the Oakland Raiders
($797 million) as the franchises with the highest and lowest values, respectively).
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any individual team or teams -sets policies, enforces rules, and regulates team
ownership, among other responsibilities delegated to it by teams.7" The office
also takes primary responsibility for assorted business and legal activities,
including the employment and supervision of referees, the scheduling of
games, the disciplining of players, and the bargaining of labor agreements. 76 As
many have observed, the NFL and similarly designed professional sports
leagues are unique creatures without clear parallels in the market of goods and
services. 77 Nonetheless, in attaching the joint venture label to league restraints,
courts have generally focused on teams' independent identities and necessary
mix of competitive and collaborative behavior.
C. The Legality of NFL Actions Under Section 1
In applying rule of reason analysis to restraints agreed to by NFL teams and
similar sports ventures, courts have usually regarded collaboration and
agreement on game rules, such as field dimensions and scoring methods, as
essential in order to play legitimate games. 78 In contrast, courts have typically
deemed off-field horizontal restraints on competition- such as player
movement restrictions, 79 entry drafts," ° and analogous devices designed to
maintain on-field competitive balance-as predominantly anticompetitive. 8'

75.

See Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, After Further Review, Are Sports Officials Independent
Contractors?,35 Am.Bus. L.J. 249, 252 n.7 (1998) (noting that NFL officials are employees of

the NFL).
76.

See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT pmbl. (20o6), available

at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=231&pid=358
("[The]
National Football League Management Council ...is recognized as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of present and future employer member clubs of the National
Football League .. ");1AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW
AND BUSINESS 151 (1997) (listing the powers of the commissioner as inclusive of the power
to discipline players); Richard J.Hunter, Jr., An "Insider's" Guide to the Legal Liability of
Sports Contest Officials, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 369, 408-09 n.130 (2004) (discussing the
NFL as the employer of referees); Peter King, Sched-Ache, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 19,
2005, at 120 (noting how the NFL configures its schedule).
See, e.g., Valley Bank of Nev. v. Plus Sys., Inc., 914 F.2d 1186, 1192 (9 th Cir. 199o)
(describing professional sports leagues as "unique").
78. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) ("'[Some]
activities can only be carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is league sports."'
(quoting BORK, supra note 49, at 278)).
79. See, e.g., Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 6o6 (8th Cir. 1976).
so. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (D.C. Cit. 1978).
77.

81.

See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982)
(noting that the league prohibition on owners making or retaining capital investment in
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The NFL and its teams have nonetheless implemented some of those restraints
through collective bargaining with the National Football League Players'
Association (NFLPA). Such collective bargaining is protected by the so-called
"nonstatutory labor exemption," which generally exempts collectively
bargained restraints from section i if they primarily affect "mandatory subjects
of bargaining" - namely, in the professional sports context, players' wages,
hours, and other employment conditions. 82 The nonstatutory labor exemption
follows from a series of Supreme Court decisions 8' and is premised on the
belief that employees' working conditions are likely to be enhanced when they
negotiate together instead of individually. 84 By negotiating together, employees
are thought to gain leverage in their bargaining with employers and to
ultimately obtain better working conditions. 8' The exemption from section 1
also provides an incentive for employers to negotiate with collective groups of
employees, as restraints instead imposed unilaterally would risk section i
scrutiny." As a result of the nonstatutory labor exemption, blatantly
anticompetitive but collectively bargained restraints, such as an artificial ceiling
on players' salaries, are exempt from section 1.
The NFL and its teams would naturally prefer to adopt policies without the
give-and-take of collective bargaining, but also without the threat of section 1.
To that end, and for almost forty years, NFL executives have posited that

another professional sports league produced
procompetitive effects).
82.

more anticompetitive

injury than

See cases cited infra note 83; see also Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (referencing the connection
between mandatory subjects of bargaining and the nonstatutory labor exemption). For a
discussion of the mandatory subjects of bargaining in the sports context, see, for example,
Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports
League LaborMarket Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19, 89-90 (1986).

83.

See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689
(1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965); see also Roberts,
supra note 82, at 58-63 (discussing the legal history of the nonstatutory labor exemption).

84.

See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steanfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975) ("The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy favoring
the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions.
Union success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price
competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if
this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws.").

85. Cf.Paul C. Weiler, A PrincipledReshaping of Labor Lawfor the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA.
J. LA. & EMP. L. 177, 186 (2001) (suggesting that professional baseball players have

historically received significantly higher compensation, relative to other workers in the
economy, when bargaining as a union rather than individually).
86.

See Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the
NFL, 56 CASE. W. REs. L. REv. 731, 738 (2006).

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

119:72 6

2oio

courts misunderstand their business model. More precisely, they bristle at the
characterization of their franchises as independent economic competitors
engaged in a joint venture.
The NFL has expressed this disapproving sentiment toward the joint
venture characterization in defending multiple antitrust claims. Perhaps most
notably, in McNeil v. NFL,87 then-commissioner Paul Tagliabue asserted that
"the business relationship among the NFL member clubs is not that of
independent economic competitors but rather that [of] co-owners engaged in a
common business enterprise, the production and marketing of professional
football entertainment."8 8 In other words, by positioning itself and its
franchises as co-owners of the same endeavor-NFL football-rather than
distinct, sometimes competing owners in the same joint venture, the NFL
would like to escape antitrust scrutiny for any restraint, even one that poses
significant anticompetitive effects and that has not been subject to the collective
bargaining process.
D. The NFL, Copperweld, and Single Entity Status
Realizing the logical challenge of arguing that distinct teams, with distinct
ownerships and distinct players, all of which compete in myriad ways, are
actually components of the same organ, the NFL has turned to the single entity
defense. The single entity defense is available to distinct entities that possess a
shared corporate consciousness, meaning they act, behave, and choose as one
and thus their collaborations do not deprive the market of any independent
sources of economic power. 8 ' Because of a single entity's structure and its
unilateral mode of behavior, its restraints cannot pose the anticompetitive risks
contemplated by section i. In fact, by enabling distinct entities to compete
more effectively with other actors in the marketplace, the entities' actions as a
single entity are thought to promote market competition.9"
The single entity defense draws principally from the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.91 In Copperweld, the
Court deemed a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary

87.

790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).

Id. at 878.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 770-73 (1984).
go. See Ryan P. Meyers, Comment, Partial Ownership of Subsidiaries, Unity of Purpose, and
Antitrust Liability, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1401, 14o6 (2001).
91. See id.
88.

8g.
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constitutive of a single entity. As a single entity, "they" -the corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary -act with a "complete unity of interest":
Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate
actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate
consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses
drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver ....

If a parent

and a wholly owned subsidiary do "agree" to a course of action, there is
no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served
different interests, and there is no justification for § i scrutiny. 2
Following the Court's logic, a parent-wholly owned subsidiary relationship
is readily distinguishable from a joint venture, since the former is viewed as
"unilateral" rather than "concerted," meaning its actions do not implicate
section 1.91 More precisely, while a wholly owned subsidiary only has one
parent entity, whose interests the subsidiary exclusively serves, joint ventures,
by definition, involve multiple participants (or "parents") that engage in a
collaborative effort for a particular goal, but which remain distinct and thus
94
subject to section 1 scrutiny.
The Court recognized an obvious point: parents and wholly owned
subsidiaries are not monolithic. They are, after all, distinct corporate entities,
often featuring different personnel and separate implementations of shared
goals. 95 Parents and wholly owned subsidiaries, under the legal "fiction" of
corporate law, are also independent legal persons with separate and distinct
legal rights and standing to enter into contracts, and to sue and be sued. 96
Wholly owned subsidiaries and their parent firms nonetheless compose a
single economic entity for antitrust purposes, incapable of collaborating,

92.

Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.

93. Id. at 771-74.
94. See Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint
Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 71-75 (1987) (addressing the differences between joint
ventures and single-parent subsidiaries); Michael D. Beasley, Comment, The Vatican Merger
Defense -Should Two Catholic Hospitals Seeking To Merge Be Considered a Single Entity for
Purposes ofAntitrust Merger Analysis?, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 720, 741 (1996) (noting that unlike
a wholly owned subsidiary and its parent, joint ventures are subject to section 1 scrutiny).
95. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of
Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (pt. 1), 55 LA. L. REv. 217, 313 (1994)
(discussing case law concerning parents and wholly owned subsidiaries that feature
different personnel, offices, and oversight procedures).
96. See Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director'sDilemma, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 323
(1996).
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agreeing, or conspiring with itself, the Court reasoned, since the economic
resources of the subsidiary firms exist only to serve its parents' interests and
97
since parents, if they so choose, can take control of those resources entirely.
Put another way, it would not make sense to prohibit a parent and subsidiary
from coordinating activities on an antitrust basis, when it would be perfectly
fine under antitrust law for the parent to engage in the identical activity via an
internal division.
The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to groups and
individuals within parents and subsidiaries: internally divergent interests do
not automatically defeat single entity status. For instance, while employees or
divisions within a firm compete over monetary compensation and other selfinterested ends, they remain members of the same firm. Their collaboration
thus does not implicate concerns of antitrust law; indeed, in order for the firm
to better compete in the marketplace, the firm expects coworkers and
codivisions to collaborate. 98 Similarly, owners or stockholders may disagree
about their firm's strategies, but they are presumed to behave as one in seeking
to maximize the firm's profits or financial wherewithal. 99
The Copperweld Court explicitly limited its holding to the setting of a
corporate parent and its wholly owned subsidiary.' Such a limitation would
seemingly prove problematic for the NFL, since it does not enjoy any parentsubsidiary relationship with its separately owned teams. The Court, on the
other hand, has not addressed whether professional sports leagues and
independently owned teams - members of a relationship that leagues and
teams routinely characterize as "special"'- might nonetheless qualify for
single entity recognition.
Prior configurations of the Court have offered signals. Writing for the
majority in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., Justice Breyer opined that in part

Coppenveld, 467 U.S. at 771-72. Under the corporate law of most states, a wholly owned
subsidiary (or any subsidiary owned ninety percent by a parent) can be merged with its
parent without a vote of the subsidiary's board of directors or shareholders. This statutory
"short form merger" gives a parent corporation discretion to eliminate entirely the separate
legal status of its subsidiary by simple action of the parent board. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit.
8, § 253 (2009).
98. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 77o-71; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEx.
L. REv. 1,1 (1984) ("Antitrust law permits, even encourages, cooperation within a 'firm,' for
such cooperation is the basis of economic productivity.").
97.

99. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771-72.
1o.

Id. at 767 ("We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for
conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.").

1ol.

See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248 (1996).
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because "they depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic survival," the
NFL and its teams resemble an undefined "single bargaining employer."" 2
Justice Breyer, however, carefully limited his observation to collective
bargaining activity and, just as meaningfully, did not connect single bargaining
employer status to Copperweld or single entity status.' °3 Although Brown
appears to amplify the NFL's preferred notion that NFL teams necessarily
cooperate for economic survival, it does so in conditional verbiage and in the
context of labor relations, which are not directly at issue in American Needle.
Additional insight may be gained from Justice Stevens's opinion in NCAA
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.1° 4 That case concerned the
NCAA and its member schools agreeing to a restraint whereby those member
schools refrained from competing in the sale of television rights and entrusted
the NCAA to execute a national television contract, the fruits of which would
be shared by the same schools. The NCAA's policy limited the right of
individual schools to negotiate separate or additional television appearances for
its teams. The restraint was challenged under section 1 by several colleges with
popular football teams. The Court held that because they competed in various
ways (for instance, on the field, when appealing to fans, in recruiting
prospective student-athletes, etc.), the schools were competitors."' The
NCAA's restraint, which bore a resemblance to the NFL's national television
contract,1° 6 was thus subject to section i scrutiny."°
Board of Regents offers limited precedential value for examining whether a
professional sports league and its independently owned teams comprise a
single entity. In crucial ways, the NCAA operates differently from the NFL and
similar professional sports leagues. Foremost, the NCAA consists of individual
colleges and universities that use it to organize and promote athletic events
between student-athletes; unlike NFL teams, which exist only because there is
an NFL, those colleges and universities would continue to exist, and would
continue to compete in other ways (for instance, with regard to admissions),
without the NCAA. °s Still, in Board of Regents, the Court unambiguously held

loz. Id. at 248,249.
103.

Id. at 248-249.

104.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).

105.

Id. at 99.

1o6.

See supra Section I.A.

107.

The restraint was deemed to violate section 1. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113-20.

io8. See Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 To
Regulate Restraints on IntraleagueRivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV.219, 244-45 (1984).
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that a market restraint on sporting events reflected the behavior of separate,
competing entities that lacked a complete unity of interest.' °9
Decisions by lower courts also lend insight as to whether the NFL and its
teams comprise a single entity. In applying Copperweld, some courts have
reasoned that business relationships less intimate than that of a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary can nevertheless evince a complete unity of interest."'
That can be true of corporate relationships that lack any shared ownership. In
Williams v. Nevada,"' for instance, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada identified a single entity between a fast food franchisor and its
separately owned franchisees.1" The court identified the commonality of
economic objectives between franchisors and franchisees, the contractual
control of franchisors over franchisees, and the matching operations of
franchisees as corroborative of unified interest."' While many courts have
rejected what could be termed single entity creep," 4 some have expanded the
scope of single entity status far beyond Copperweld's confines.
More germane to the NFL, while no circuit court prior to American Needle
had explicitly found a professional sports league and its independently owned
franchises to be a single entity, several circuit courts have intimated support for
single entity recognition. In his majority opinion in Chicago Professional Sports
Ltd. Partnershipv. NBA,"' Judge Frank Easterbrook suggested that single entity
analysis could be appropriate for certain aspects of league behavior, such as
"when selling broadcast rights to a network in competition with a thousand
other producers of entertainment," but not for other actions, such as those
implicating players' employment opportunities." 6 He reasoned that when
soliciting bids for bundled packages of NBA games, the NBA acted as a single

109.

Cf Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust
Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REv. 329, 338 (2007) (noting that, in Board of Regents, "the Supreme
Court implicitly determined that the NCAA is not a single entity").

11o.

See, e.g., Novatel Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cellular Tel. Supply, Inc., No. C85-2674A, 1986 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16017, at *25-26 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1986) (holding that single entity status
should depend on the capacity of the parent to legally control the subsidiary rather than on
the mere presence of complete ownership).

Mii. 794 F. Supp.
112.

1026

(D. Nev.

1992).

Id. at 1031.

113. Id.; see also Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 4o7 F.3d 1027,
1035 ( 9 th Cir. 2005) (identifying a single entity in the context of a dog breeding club and its
separately owned regional cooperatives).
114. See Meyers, supra note go, at 1407-o8.
115.

95 F-3 d 593 ( 7 th Cit. 1996).

116. Id. at 6oo.
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NBA teams, but
bargaining employer which competed not with individual
7
entertainment."1
of
providers
rather with myriad other
In Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL,",8 the Third Circuit also intimated support.
While carefully resisting the NFL's preferred conclusion that its teams not be
subject to section 1,the court nonetheless surmised that NFL teams do not
resemble economic competitors and thus their restraints may not be suitable
for antitrust scrutiny." 9
In spite of these intimations, it is worth reiterating that until the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in American Needle, not one U.S. Court of Appeals had
expressly recognized a professional sports league and its independently owned
franchises as a single entity. In fact, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, 2
Second,' 2 ' Sixth,' 2 Ninth," 3 and D.C." Circuits have categorically rejected
such a characterization. In their view, teams with independent value, with
separate identities on and off the field, and which compete for players, coaches,
fans, and media attention, cannot share a "corporate consciousness," at least
not as originally conceived by Copperweld or even as more loosely imagined by
Too often, in those circuit courts' view, teams possess
other courts.'
unaligned motives and routinely do not pursue the common interests of the
whole.
Courts, in fact, have even refused to extend the single entity defense to a
professional sports league that purposefully organized as a single entity. In

117.

Id.

118.720 F.2d 772 ( 3 d Cir. 1983).
i19.Id. at 786-87.
120.

See Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F. 3 d lO91, lO99

(lst

Cir. 1994); see also Marc

Edelman, Why the "Single Entity" Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer on
Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
891, 893 n.11 (2008) (discussing courts' rejection of the single entity defense for professional
sports leagues).
121.
122.

123.

124.

125.

See N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F. 3d 462,
469 (6th Cir. 2005).
See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388-90 (9 th Cir.
1984).
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (implicitly rejecting the
argument that the NFL is a single entity); see also Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust
Implications of FranchiseRelocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, S3 FORDHAM L. REV. 157,
169 n.49 (characterizing the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Smith as implicitly rejecting the
argument that the NFL is a single entity).
See, e.g., L.A. Mem'l, 726 F.2d at 1390 (noting that in the NFL, "profits and losses are not
shared, a feature common to partnerships or other 'single entities"').
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Fraserv. MLS, 2 6 the First Circuit rejected the attempt of Major League Soccer
(MLS) to obtain classification as a single entity. Cognizant of case law that
characterized the "big four" leagues 127 as joint ventures, organizers of MLS
thought they could devise a league that would be more compatible with single
entity status.12' This would allow the league to implement, without collective
bargaining, regressive pay scales and limitations on free agency that might
otherwise run afoul of section 1.
At its inception in 1994, MLS owned all of the league's franchises, executed
employment contracts between it and each player, assigned players to
franchises, controlled the league and franchise intellectual property rights,
centrally planned licensing and merchandise strategies, and assumed teams'
liabilities, among other centrally executed behaviors. 129 Franchises, which were
operated by MLS employees known as "operator-investors," enjoyed only a
few autonomous privileges and duties, such as the hiring of coaches and
administrative staff, as well as the payment of local promotional costs.13 0
Franchise "owners" actually invested in the MLS limited liability company
itself, and acquired limited control over a single team, but had no ownership
stake in the team per se. Naturally, franchises competed on the soccer field.
Performance incentives, whereby operator-investors of successful franchises
would receive higher pay, further encouraged inter-team competition.''
Despite MLS's common ownership arrangement and largely centralized
operations, the First Circuit declined to regard it as a single entity.
Highlighting the mixed incentives for operator-investors, who are MLS
employees but also seem to have a greater stake in one franchise's success, the
court characterized the MLS as "a hybrid arrangement, somewhere between a
single company . .

and a cooperative arrangement between existing

.

126.

284 F. 3 d 47 (ist Cir.

127.

Courts have distinguished the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL as "major professional sports
leagues." See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d

Cir.
i2s.

2002).

1982).

See Edelman, supra note

120,

at

901-02

(discussing the origins of MLS); see also Joshua D.

Wright, MasterCard'sSingle Entity Strategy, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv.

225, 230 (2007)

(noting

that in addition to MLS, the Continental Basketball Association, the Women's National
Basketball Association, and the American Basketball League all attempted to organize
themselves as single entities in hopes of obtaining protection from Copperveld).
129. See Matt Link, MLS Scores Against Its Players: Fraser v. Major League Soccer, LLC, i DEPAUL
J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 76, 76-77 (2003); see also Edelman, supra note 120, at 9o1-

o2 (supplying additional detail on the formation of MLS).
13o. Link, supra note
131.

129,

at 76-77.

Wright, supra note 128, at 231.
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competitors."' 3 Such a hybrid arrangement was deemed to be within the scope
of section i and thus outside the classification of a single entity. Fraserposited a
dim outlook for the configuration of a franchise-based professional sports
league that could evade section 1.
E. American Needle and the Sports BroadcastingAct of 1961: A Contextual
Comparison
Whatever its legal merits, the NFL's pursuit of single entity status is
rational. An exemption from section 1 would insulate the NFL's business
strategies from section 1 and, less obviously, the considerable legal expenses
133
often associated with defending section i claims.
Through the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961' (SBA), the NFL, along
with the NBA, MLB, and the NHL, already know of the possible benefits: the
SBA exempts the four leagues from violating section 1 in their national
television contracts. The SBA reflected a legislative response to a federal court's
decision in United States v. NFL,13s where the pooling of NFL teams'
broadcasting rights into one package, which eliminated competition for local
broadcasting rights, was deemed to violate section 1.136 Until the NFL
successfully lobbied Congress for passage of the SBA, 3 7 United States v. NFL
had threatened Rozelle's plan to utilize
shared television revenue as a means of
38
balance.
competitive
maintaining
Like the SBA, which exempts the NFL from violating section 1 in the
confined context of national television contracts, American Needle exempts the
NFL from violating section 1 in the confined context of apparel sales. Indeed, in
American Needle, the Seventh Circuit found that section 1 did not apply to the

132.

Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C.,

133.

To illustrate, the NFL reportedly spent $50 million in legal fees and settlement costs in Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). Marc D. Oram,
The Stadium Financingand Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 184, 190

284

F. 3 d 4 7 , s8 (ist Cir. 2002).

(2000).
134.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (20o6). The Act provided the NFL, along with the NBA, the MLB,
and the NHL, with an exemption for purposes of a national television contract over
sponsored broadcasting.

135.

196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).

136.

Id. at 447.
See Phillip M. Cox II, Note, Flag on the Play? The SiphoningEffect on Sports Television, 47 FED.
COMM. L.J. 571, 574 (1995) (discussing the SBA's history).
See Roberts, supra note 25, at 56-57 (discussing the NFL's ambitions to utilize television
broadcasts as an equalizing device).

137.
138.
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NFL's decision, through NFLP, to license each team's intellectual property
rights exclusively to Reebok.' 39
As this Feature will explore in Part II, the Seventh Circuit's analysis was
relatively straightforward, if at times cursory, surmising that because teams
voluntarily assign the licensing of their club marks to the league-controlled
NFLP, they share one consciousness with NFLP. In response to clear evidence
that teams compete in many other ways, Judge Kanne, citing Judge
Easterbrook from Chicago ProfessionalSports, rejected as "silly" the notion that a
4
single entity can exist only if teams refrain from competition in all contexts.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the NFL and its teams may constitute a
single entity for a limited purpose and remain a joint venture for other
purposes.
Although the SBA and American Needle are similar in supplying situationspecific exemptions from section 1,they are different in an important way:
American Needle suggests that the NFL and other leagues may also enjoy
exemption in other, albeit unspecified, circumstances. 141 Judge Kanne, quoting
Judge Easterbrook in Chicago Professional Sports, obliquely noted that courts
should address the merits of leagues' proposed single entity defenses "one
league at a time [and] one facet of a league at a time.' 1 42 As will be discussed in
Part TV, the Supreme Court can provide the clarity eschewed by Seventh
Circuit jurists.
II. UNRAVELING AMERICAN NEEDLE

There are competing perspectives from which to assess the American Needle
controversy. As will be explored in this Part, advocates of single entity
recognition for professional sports leagues tend to portray the often symbiotic
structure of league operations as not only compatible with single entity
recognition, but also essential for league survival. Opponents, on the other
hand, typically rely on apparent flaws in the legal reasoning necessary for a
league to obtain single entity recognition.

139. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7 th Cir. 20o8).
140. Id. (citing Chi. Prof'I Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F. 3d 593, 598 (7 th Cir.
1996)).
141. Id. at 742.
142.

Id. (quoting Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F. 3d 593, 6oo (7th
Cir. 1996)).
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A. Arguments in Favorof Recognizing the NFL as a Limited or Complete Single

Entity
First, American Needle reflects an arguably logical approach to
understanding the NFL's business operations and is consistent with a gradual
expansion of the single entity defense. The logic of the Seventh Circuit's
opinion can be found in the collective manner in which the NFL and its teams
choose to operate. Although teams agree to retain ownership in their
intellectual property rights and preserve the capacity to negotiate independent
intellectual property agreements,'43 they entrust the licensing of most of their
rights to the league-run NFLP, which, through the NFL Trust, equally
distributes net profits. By choosing to engage in collective action, teams thus
lack economic incentive to compete with one another over the sale of their
NFLP-licensed intellectual property rights. While certain teams, such as those
particularly reliant upon licensing revenue or those uniquely disadvantaged by
NFLP's egalitarian sharing, may be inclined to exert undue influence on NFLP
policies, NFLP is structurally designed to promote a unity of interest between
the NFL, NFLP, and NFL teams. Most notably, each of the thirty-two NFL
teams owns an equal share in NFLP and appoints one member of the NFLP's
thirty-two member board, which typically acts by a majority vote.' 44 This
symbiotic arrangement exists because the NFL and its teams concluded that it
maximizes their business interests and promotes the league's sustainability. Put
differently, at least in terms of apparel sales, NFLP, the NFL, and NFL teams
appear, by design, to act with a shared consciousness.
For that reason, the separately owned and frequently competitive nature of
NFL teams could be considered irrelevant for determining whether NFL teams
act as a single entity in the context of intellectual property. In other words,
single entity analysis for a pro sports league may be best conducted on a microlevel, with assessments of specific behaviors undertaken by the league and its
teams, rather than on a macro-level, where the mere presence of separate
franchise ownerships or of various competitions and collaborations might, for
some jurists, automatically preclude single entity recognition.
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard D. Cudahy alluded to this line of reasoning

in his Chicago Professional Sports concurrence. Cudahy observed no inherent
difference between teams that are separately owned and those owned by a
common entity:

143.

See infra Section II.B. (discussing the settlement between the Dallas Cowboys and the NFL
that enabled NFL owners to negotiate intellectual property contracts for their own teams).

144. See Oaldand Raiders v. Nat'l Football League, 93 Cal. App. 4 th 572, 579 (2001) ("[NFLP]

[a]ction generally requires a majority vote."); CoNRAD,supra note 15, at 270.
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[A] league of independently-owned teams, if it is no more likely than a
single firm to make inefficient management decisions, should be treated
as a single entity. The single entity question thus would boil down to
"whether member clubs of a sports league have legitimate economic
interests of their own, independent of the league and each other."14s
Sports law commentator Dean Gary Roberts emphasizes a similar point in
advocating for recognition of the NFL and its teams as a single entity. Dean
Roberts contends that in spite of the separate ownership of franchises, the
"self-contained, wholly-integrated" nature of U.S. sports leagues like the NFL
and its franchises is compatible with single entity status.

46

More precisely, a

team cannot generate profits in the absence of at least one other team; in a
league of one team, no games would be played and fans would presumably be
indifferent toward such a team and any licensed merchandise. From that
vantage point, separate ownership of franchises more accurately reflects joint
47
ownership of the same company.
A similar inference can be drawn from teams' retention of significant
portions of their revenue. 148 Although such an arrangement, which conflicts
with the league's predominant emphasis on sharing, might ostensibly
undermine the NFL's pursuit of single entity recognition, in actuality, it may
engender the opposite effect. By ensuring that teams maintain selfish economic
incentives, fans are more likely to receive a competitive product, which would
attract their interest and dollars.1 49 At the same time, by ensuring that teams
share most of their revenue, the NFL can better achieve competitive balance,
which attracts fans' interest and dollars to the NFL. As it is designed, therefore,
the NFL's sharing/preservation amalgam maximizes total wealth for the NFL.
Teams, in that light, better resemble instruments of the NFL than discrete
entities.

145.

Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 603 (7 th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Gary R. Roberts, The Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues Revisited, 64 TUL. L. REV.
117, 127 (1989)).

146.

See Roberts, supra note 25, at 65-66.

147.

See Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under Section i of the Sherman
Act: An Alternative View, 6o TUL. L. REv. 562, 572 (1986). But see, e.g., Goldman, supra note
ii, at 763-75 (criticizing Roberts as offering a view that is inconsistent with precedent and
that overstates the necessary level of cooperation by teams).
See supra notes 68-7o and accompanying text.

148.

149. See J. Scott Hale, Jerry Jones Versus the NFL: An Opportunity To Apply Logically the Single
Entity Defense to the NFL, 4 SPORTs LAw.J. 1, 8 (1997).
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A second possible justification for American Needle lies in its structural
compatibility with the SBA."' By recognizing that the NFL may need to act as a
single entity in certain business endeavors, the SBA's legislative history could
be construed as offering similar reasoning to that enunciated in American
Needle.'"' Such a need is based on the sustainability of revenue-disadvantaged
teams "whose economic survival is essential to the continued operation of the
league itself."'5 2 The endurance of the SBA suggests this recognition remains.
On the other hand, and as Part TV will assert, the SBA may suggest that
Congress, rather than the courts, is best equipped to supply a section 1
exemption: Congress passed the SBA because there would have otherwise been
a section 1 violation.
Third, American Needle is arguably consistent with economic theories that
have gained traction in antitrust law." 3 Consider, for instance, the writings of
economists Edward Chamberlin and William Fellner, both of whom concluded
that in the absence of unnaturally high prices or other indicia of collusive
activity, antitrust law should permit cooperation between economic entities
that share pursuits. 4 In other words, the focus of antitrust law should rest on
consumer effects, not producer means.' Their views are congruent with some
official commentaries on the appropriate role of antitrust law for the NFL. For
instance, when assessing the bill that would later become the SBA, the House
Judiciary Committee reasoned that "the public interest in viewing professional
sports warrants" a limited exemption from section 1.156

15O. See supra Section I.E.

151. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletics Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.28 (1984) ("The
legislative history of [the SBA] demonstrates Congress' recognition that agreements among
league members to sell television rights in a cooperative fashion could run afoul of the
Sherman Act ... ").
152. Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: Hearingon H.R. 8757 Before the Antitrust Subcomm.
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 8 7th Cong. 1 (1961) (statement of Hon. Emanuel Celler,
Chairman, Antitrust Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also Stephen F.
Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463,
468-71 (199o) (discussing the SBA's legislative history).
153. See, e.g., Dean Harvey, Anticompetitive Social Norms as Antitrust Violations, 94 CAL. L. REV.

769, 776 (20o6) ("Courts substantially rely upon evolving economic theory to discern
whether there is an agreement under section 1 of the Sherman Act.").
,54. See WIuLIAM FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW 130-33 (1949); E.H. Chamberlin,
Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few, 44 QJ. ECON. 63, 83-84 (1929).
155.

FELLNER, supra note 154.

156. H.R. REP. No. 87-1178, at 3 (1961) (describing comments from the House Judiciary

Committee).
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Although anecdotal and constrained by limited discovery in American
Needle,lr7 available empirical evidence of consumer effects presents a mixed
account. In its petition for certiorari, American Needle cited comments from a
Reebok executive who, in 2006, mused that "because of the price pressures,"
caps which previously sold for $19.99 were selling for $30.00. s5 The
comments appear consistent with the aforementioned goals of Chuck Zona,
who, in attempting to equip NFL-licensed apparel with a "core identity,"
recommended a reduction in inventory and licensees.' 9 While such a reduction
would seemingly disadvantage consumers, the experiences of retailers may
suggest otherwise: by 2005, retailers noticed a significant increase in the sales
of NFL-licensed apparel, a phenomenon they partly attributed to consumers
perceiving Reebok's apparel as "special. '' , 6' The higher price may thus have
reflected intensified demand for superior products as much as, if not more
than, diminished supply of inferior ones. The exclusive contract between
Reebok and NFLP also arguably benefited consumers by facilitating
collaborations with other Reebok product lines. 61 Of course, as American
Needle would argue, an analysis of quality, choice, and price 6goes to the heart
of section 1scrutiny, which single entity recognition removes. ,
Consumer wealth maximization theory, which posits that consumers are
rational actors and respond to disfavored products by no longer purchasing
them, may also corroborate American Needle. 6 , Since businesses are motivated
to adjust operations or risk losing business, several sports law scholars
maintain that pro leagues should receive broad autonomy to restrain
competition: if sports fans are dissatisfied with the quality of play offered by a
professional league (or the quality of its connected products), they can readily

157.

It should be noted that American Needle was only afforded discovery for the single entity
question. The discovery did not extend to whether the contract's purpose or effect may have
violated section i. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F. 3 d 736, 739 (7 th Cir.
2008) (providing a summary of American Needle's discovery limitations).

158. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 129 S. Ct.
2859 (2009) (No. o8-661).
159. See supra Section I.A.
16o. See Thomas J. Ryan, Feeling the Heat: Licensed Outerwear Creates New Sparks of Innovation
and Demand, SPORTING GOODS Bus., Jan. 2005, at 56, 56-57.
161.
See Fashion Forward: What Should You Buy?, GOLF WORLD Bus., Aug. 1, 2002, at ii
(discussing the placement of NFL team logos on Reebok Golf products).
162.
163.

See supra Section I.B.
See Grauer, supra note 72, at 7-9.
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turn to substitute entertainment products. 6 ' Dissatisfied fans can follow a
different league, for instance, or embrace another form of entertainment. Then
again, NFL football and other leagues which dominate the professional playing
of their sports may be incomparable and devoid of substitutes, even if lesser
leagues or other forms of entertainment are available.16
To be sure, recent findings in behaviorism and behavioral law and
economics deeply challenge the rational actor model.166 These critiques seem
particularly salient when observing alleged market manipulation of consumers'
subconscious attitudes and motivations. 6' Nonetheless, the core premise that
what they consciously dislike seems fairly certain,
consumers do not purchase
68
incontrovertible.
if not

164. Id. at 34 n.156; see also Roberts, supra note io8, at 238-60 (distinguishing a sports league

from other forms of business organization, including joint ventures); Nathaniel Grow,
Note, There's No "I"in "League": ProfessionalSports Leagues and the Single Entity Defense, o5
MICH. L. REv. 183, 191-96, 198 (2006) (arguing that single entity leagues benefit consumers
since the leagues operate more efficiently, thus producing a more attractive product).
165. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that continuous sell-outs of
NFL games, despite expensive ticket prices, and the extraordinary numbers of persons who
watch the Super Bowl suggest that the NFL has "limited substitutes" for consumers. L.A.
Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1393 ( 9 th Cit. 1984); see

also Lock, supra note 12, at 404 (arguing that NFL fans do not possess a substitute for their
desired product).
166. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics To Show the Power and Efficiency of
CorporateLaw as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 5o STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 741 (2008); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, A FutureHistory of Implicit Social Cognition and

the Law (UCLA School of Law Research Paper, No. 09-26, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1458678.
167. See, e.g., Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Nafve Cynicism: MaintainingFalse Perceptions in
Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499 (2008); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking

Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 724
(1999).
168. See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 251-56 (2006)

(asserting that consumers, while commonly susceptible to cognitive biases, should not have
their capacity to make financial decisions restricted by government actors); Alfred C. Yen,
Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1207, 1239 (2002) (describing consumer rationality in purchasing domain

names); Todd J. Zywicki, Debra Holt & Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Obesity and Advertising
Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979, 1011 (2004) (arguing that consumers possess the

decision-making capacity to choose to purchase their preferred foods).
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B. Arguments Against the Seventh Circuit'sReasoning in American Needle
A principal objection to American Needle rests in the Seventh Circuit's legal
reasoning. The court crafted its logic around an unsettled proposition: because
NFL teams voluntarily assign the licensing of intellectual property rights to the
league-controlled NFLP, teams must share consciousness with NFLP.
In an attempt to validate this proposition, Judge Kanne curiously
championed as "most important" the forty-six year history of NFL teams
choosing to become one source of economic power for purposes of intellectual
property licensing. ' 6 The opinion does not cite Copperweld or any other case to
support placing such significance on either the choice of NFL teams to collude
or on the continuous length of time they have done so. In fact, as noted by the
Solicitor General in opposing certiorari, a continued choice to refrain from
competing is hardly dispositive as to whether the activity complies with
antitrust law. 17o
More vexing, Judge Kanne's proposition arguably belies the attention paid
by Copperweld to whether a restraint deprived a relevant market of independent
sources of economic power. A key rationale for the Court in Copperweld rested
on the conceptual impossibility of a parent "joining" its already wholly owned
(and controlled) subsidiary. After all, the Copperweld Court reasoned, a parent
and wholly owned subsidiary are always one for purposes of assessing
economic power, meaning, logically, they cannot join hands at any time or in
any way.' 71 Judge Kanne addresses the matter of independent sources of
economic power by wryly asking, "Who wins when a football team plays
itself?, 1 72 but his question overlooks the possibility that teams, unlike a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary, could compete over the sale of apparel and
thus could join hands in anticompetitive ways. Indeed, a wholly owned
subsidiary lacks the functional ability to act independently and contrary to its
parent's economic interests; by contrast, an individual NFL team with, for
instance, a highly marketable team logo could certainly choose to sign with a
rival apparel maker and compete directly with the central NFL apparel licensee.
Uncovering the presence of independent sources of economic power also
need not be fashioned as a hypothetical or, to borrow Judge Kanne's parlance,
a "Zen riddle. 1 73 Although Judge Kanne largely ignored this point, teams

169. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7 th Cir. 2008).
170. Brief for United States, supra note 16, at 18-2o.
iin.

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-73 (1984).

17a. Am. Needle, 538 F. 3 d at 743.
173. Id.
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competed over intellectual property sales prior to formation of NFLP in
1963.174 Moreover, as highlighted in the Solicitor General's brief, the Dallas
Cowboys successfully sued the NFL and NFLP in the mid-199os in order to not
share merchandise revenue with other NFL teams.1 7 ' Less directly related,
though still illuminating, is the fact that other sports associations, such as the
NCAA, feature individual team management of apparel sales.176 By failing to
examine the fact that NFL teams have competed, and could still complete, with
one another, the Seventh Circuit declined to consider whether, through NFLP,
NFL teams "join" their economic power, and thus whether NFLP's exclusive
contract with Reebok adversely impacted market competition and consumer
interests.
American Needle is similarly inattentive to precedent and the unwillingness
of federal circuit courts to characterize a professional sports league and its
independently owned franchises as a single entity. 177 While the Seventh Circuit

need not follow other circuits, American Needle pays scant attention to other
circuit courts' analyses and may unwittingly create incentives for forum
shopping. In addition, although the Supreme Court has not spoken on
whether a professional sports league can obtain single entity status, its analysis
in Board of Regents seemed unwelcoming of the idea.7 8 The Seventh Circuit
declined to address either the reasoning or conclusion in Board of Regents, let
alone substantively compare the purported79presence of a single entity in the
NFL with the absence of one in the NCAA.'
As another source of criticism, the Seventh Circuit could have, and likely
would have, reached the same result under rule of reason. In applying rule of
reason to NFLP's exclusive contract with Reebok, a court would weigh its
procompetitive effects and anticompetitive effects. To the NFL's advantage,
courts have typically regarded pooled licensing arrangements of the sort

174.

See YOST, supra note 30, at 122-23 (discussing how prior to the creation of NFLP, NFL teams
individually entered into apparel contracts, for their own economic benefit, with the NFL
possessing little control over teams' apparel choices or the ramifications of their choices on
league competitiveness).

175.See Brief for United States, supra note 16, at ii n.3; infra notes 191-195 and accompanying

text.
In the NCAA, schools manage their own apparel and merchandise sales. See C. Knox
Withers, Sine qua Non: Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of Confusion, and the Business of
CollegiateLicensing, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 421,434-36 (2004).
177. See supra Section I.D.
176.

178. See supra Section I.D.
179. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F. 3 d 736, 743 (7 th Cir. 2008) (noting with

approval the Court's reasoning in Board of Regents that some activities can only be carried
out jointly, but omitting mention of the Court's disposition).
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present between NFL teams and Reebok as enhancing competion. 8' The
a bundle that can be sold more
pooling of license rights is thought to create
8
efficiently than separately marketed rights.' ,
Additionally, the NFL could establish that NFLP facilitates collaboration
and coordination, which in turn enhances NFLP products and strengthens the
capacity of the league and its teams to compete with other sports apparel
producers. In fact, as noted by the Solicitor General, much of the Seventh
Circuit's comfort with the single entity characterization is motivated 8by the
efficiency enhancing characteristics of the NFL's licensing arrangement. ,
In applying rule of reason analysis, a court would also consider the
anticompetitive effects of the exclusive contract. By refraining from competing
over apparel sales, the teams may have denied the marketplace of competition
that would benefit consumers. An exclusive contract causing a diminution in
competition would seem particularly possible in the apparel market, which
features low barriers to entry for potential competitors' (in contrast to media
and broadcast markets-the subject of Chicago Professional Sports-which are
characterized by high startup and fixed coStS84). Available data concerning the
NFL's exclusive contract with Reebok, however, does not reveal obvious
consumer injuries. 115 Moreover, so long as procompetitive effects outweighed
them, anticompetitive effects would be acceptable under rule of reason.
Thus, through American Needle, the Seventh Circuit may have
unnecessarily extended single entity status to professional sports leagues and
their independently owned franchises, even though joint NFL licensing may
have survived rule of reason analysis anyway. Such an extension runs contrary
to broader trends in antitrust law, which, in many ways, has become more
scrutinizing in recent years.' 86 Indeed, while the Seventh Circuit identified an

i8o. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5, at 28 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/

atr/public/guidelines/o558.htm.
181. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
182. Brief for United States, supra note 16, at 8-9.
183. See Kim Clark, Apparel Makers Move South, FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 1997, at 62. But see supra
Section II.A. (discussing consumer benefits from the exclusive contract in the context of
professional football).
184. See, e.g., Michelle I. Seelig, Survey of General ManagersPerceptions of Technology, FEEDBACK,
Mar. 2005, at 34, 41 (noting that many recent innovations in the media industry require high
startup costs).
18S. See supra Section II.A.

186. See Spencer Weber Wailer, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REv. 1383, 1446 (1998) (discussing the Justice Department's increased
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exemption from section 1 for the NFL, other courts have narrowed existing
section 1 exemptions. 18 7 Even more problematic, by furnishing limited
guidance as to the contours of the NFL-based single entity defense, the
Seventh Circuit could have unintentionally invited other types of businesses to
claim the defense.
A third core objection to single entity recognition of the NFL relates to the
ownership structure of franchise intellectual property. Namely, if the NFL's
licensing of intellectual property constitutes single entity action-and thus the
independently owned franchises operate with a shared "corporate
consciousness" -why do the franchises bother to retain ownership in their
intellectual property?
Taken together, the league could maintain its egalitarian interests while
more clearly resembling a single entity if it, or NFLP, obtained teams'
intellectual property rights and then distributed licensing revenue as currendy
achieved through NFLP and the NFL Trust. The record, however, reveals no
effort by the league to obtain those rights or willingness of the teams to dispose
of them. Although the Seventh Circuit regarded it as incidental, teams'
continued ownership of intellectual property might prove far more suggestive:
even in the relatively narrow context of apparel sales, teams may not view
themselves as a single entity.
History may be corroborative of this critique. While the Seventh Circuit is
correct that NFL teams have employed NFLP since 1963, they have clearly not
shared a corporate consciousness for the entire ride, and their behavior
suggests that cooperation between NFL teams is not required for the NFL to
secure an apparel contract. Consider the litigious relationship between NFLP
and Jerry Jones, owner of the Dallas Cowboys and longtime NFLP critic. 188
During the early to mid-199os, the Cowboys accounted for one-fifth of
NFL merchandise revenue and twice as much as the second highest revenueproducing team. 8 9 Seeking to profit from his team's popularity, Jones entered
into licensing and sponsorship contracts with various companies. Some of
those companies competed with NFLP-licensed companies. Jones, for instance,

efforts in enforcing antitrust regulations); see also Maria Kantzavelos, Forecastfor Legal Work
Under Obama, CHI. LAw., Jan. 2009, at 26 (discussing the likelihood of increased antitrust

scrutiny under President Obama).
i87. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 12o HARV. L. REv.

1468

(2007)

(supplying an overview of recent limitations of antitrust exemptions).

188. See John Helyar, Ride 'Em Cowboy: Desperate To Revive America's Team, JerryJones Swallowed

His Pride,Hired a Tuna, and Became a Team Player, FORTUNE, Sept. 29,

2003,

at 58.

189. See Richard Sandomir, Dollarsand Dallas:League of Their Own?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995,
at Fi.
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entered into a contract with Nike to provide Cowboys coaches with sideline
apparel even though NFLP enjoyed an exclusive contract with Reebok for that
service.' 9° Predictably, NFLP disapproved of Jones's licensing contracts,
especially when another owner, Robert Kraft of the New England Patriots,
followed Jones's model by reaching similar arrangements for his team.' 9'
In 1995, the philosophical chasm between Jones and NFLP led to mutual
lawsuits. Among other claims, the NFLP asserted tortious interference and
misappropriation of property, ' while Jones argued that NFLP's centralized
exclusive license policy constituted a violation of section J.'
94
The parties reached a settlement before their claims were adjudicated.'
The settlement affirmed NFLP's collective authority but also freed NFL owners
to negotiate intellectual property contracts for their own teams.1 9 The
Cowboys, for instance, could continue to use Pepsi as its official soft drink,
while Coca-Cola could remain the NFL's official soft drink. 9 6 With teambased exceptions from NFLP licensing and sponsorship contracts, the
economic value of the NFLP contracts plummeted. Coca-Cola, for example,
paid $14 million a year to secure the NFL's official soft drink license prior to
97
the Jones-NFLP settlement, but only $4 million following the settlement.1
At a minimum, the Cowboys-NFLP litigation reveals that, contrary to the
Seventh Circuit's logic, NFL teams do not necessarily act as one for licensing

19o. See Sanjay Jose Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: FranchiseFreeAgency and the New Economics of
the NFL, 7MARQ SPORTS L.J. 1, 35 (1996).
191.

See

MICHAEL ORIARD, BRAND NFL: MAKING AND SELLING AMERICA'S FAVORITE SPORT 151

(2007).
192.

Complaint, NFL Props., Inc. v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd.,

922

F. Supp. 849

(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 95 Civ. 7951).
193.

Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Nat'l Football League Trust, No. 95-9426, 1996 WL
6o1705 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1996).

194.

195.

See NFL/Jerry Jones Drop Legal Claims, SPoRTsBUSINESS
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/42952.

Dec.

16,

1996,

See Mark Kass, Score Another Victory for Jerry Jones' Dallas Cowboys, BUS. J. MILWAUKEE,
Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://www.bizjournals.conl/milwaukee/stories/1996/12/23/
newscolumn2.html; Richard Sandomir, Jones-N.F.L. Lawsuits May End in a Draw, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. lo, 1996, at B17.

196. See ORARD, supra note 191, at 151-52.
197.

DAILY,

Id.
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matters.' 98 Indeed, as Jones himself argued, NFL teams clearly do not "need"
the NFLP for the sale of merchandise and apparel. 99
The litigation also highlights the routinely factionalized network of NFL
owners and suggests that the individualized ownership structure of the thirtytwo NFL teams may be poorly designed for single entity status. While
Copperweld and its progeny indicate that internally divergent interests do not
automatically defeat single entity status and that unified "corporate
consciousness" can extend to varying types of business relationships, NFL
owners unquestionably clash about league policies, and they often subscribe to
conflicting philosophies about the desired relationship between franchises and
the league.
After all, Jones's tensions with other owners represents just one of several
ideological chasms. Owners of "big market" teams and those of "small market"
teams, for instance, are known to differ on league rules for player salaries."'
Similar differences are apparent among owners who paid hundreds of millions
of dollars to obtain their teams and those who inherited them and thus did not
incur acquisition costs.' °
These and other factions meaningfully impact the NFL's operations. The
selection of an NFL commissioner is illustrative. 0 A person nominated to
become commissioner must receive a vote from two-thirds of the thirty-two
ownership groups. In the most recent election, which occurred in 20o6, five
rounds of balloting were required before a caucus of owners supporting
Deputy Commissioner Roger Goodell prevailed over one supporting Goodell's
principal opposition, attorney Gregg Levy. 0 3 The rivalry represented far more
than different preferences about two individuals. Peter King, a prominent
commentator on the NFL, described the owners as "fractious" because of
assorted policy disagreements and grievances, most notably over the gap
between teams in their unshared revenue. 4

198. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2008).
199. See Sandomir, supra note 189. In calling for the end of NFLP in 1995, Jones mused, "You
don't have to be a rocket scientist to do better than [NFLP]." Id.
200. See Rick Gosselin, Share & Share Alike? Revenue DistributionAmong Clubs a Key Topic in NFL
These Days, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 29, 2005, at 5C.
201.

PIKE MASTERALEXIS, CAROL A. BARR & MARY A. HUMS, PRINCIPLES AND PRACrICE OF
SPORT MANAGEMENT 208-09 (2009).

See LISA

202. Morris v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 1013, l1o6 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (citing NFL
CONST. art. VIII, § 8.1).

Goodell Led Voting Wire to Wire, ESPN.cOM, Aug. 9, 20o6,
http://sports.espn.go.conVnfl/news/story?id= 2544277.
204. Peter King, A Man Bornfor the Job, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 21, 2006, at 52, 52.

203. See Len Pasquarelli,
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The 2006 commissioner election was not a singular manifestation of the
deep divisions among NFL owners. In fact, correlative factions will likely
emerge in 2010 as the NFL and NFLPA attempt to negotiate a new collective
bargaining
agreement. 205
Probable
disagreements
include
revised
configurations for sharing revenue and assistance for owners saddled with
debt. o6 Particularly, as some owners struggle to bankroll their teams in the
midst of a recession, and as unshared, location-specific revenue sources grow in
value for some teams but not others, owners may become less collaborative on
economic matters and thus bear less resemblance to a single entity. 7
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF SINGLE ENTITY STATUS FOR THE NFL, OTHER
LEAGUES,

AND THE NCAA

If affirmed by the Supreme Court, American Needle would bestow upon
professional sports leagues a status coveted by, though typically unattainable
for, U.S. businesses. If the Court further interpreted single entity status to
include mandatory subjects of bargaining, American Needle would also result in
a massive diminution in bargaining power for players' associations."
The potential thrust of American Needle rests in its indefiniteness. The
Seventh Circuit opined that the availability of the single entity defense should
be addressed on a league-by-league, matter-by-matter basis. 0 9 Save for
implying that labor matters would be inappropriate for single entity
treatment,210 the Seventh Circuit neither signaled any limits nor suggested any
discrete criteria for understanding the appropriate place of single entity status.

2os. In May 2008, NFL owners voted unanimously to end their current collective bargaining

agreement with the NFLPA in 2011. See Jarrett Bell, NFL Owners End Labor Deal; Questions
Abound, USA ToDAY, May 21, 2008, at Ci.

2o6. See Jason Cole, CBA Figures To Be Hot Topic During Meetings, YAHoo! SPORTS,
May 19, 2008, http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=jc-cbaandownersoS19o8 (discussing
dissension among specific owners regarding revenue sharing).
207. For a discussion of location-specific revenue sources, see supra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text.
2o8. Some advocates of recognizing professional sports leagues and their independently owned
teams as single entities believe single entity status should not extend to labor matters. See,
e.g., Grow, supra note 164, at 188 ("The same unity of interest does not exist among all
teams in labor disputes.").
209. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F. 3 d 736, 742 (7 th Cir. 2008).
210. See id. at 741-42 ("[I] ndividuals seeking employment with any of the league's teams would
view the league as a collection of loosely affiliated companies that all have the independent
authority to hire and fire employees. That being said, we have nevertheless embraced the
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As will be explored in Part IV, the Supreme Court could and, in my view,
should furnish limiting characteristics to single entity recognition of
professional sports leagues and their teams. If the Court instead were to affirm
the Seventh Circuit's less bounded conception, it would open the door for
professional sports leagues to pursue single entity protection for a wide range
of business activities. The Court could procure a similar effect by adopting a
rigid but nonetheless expansive interpretation of the single entity defense.
If affirmed, American Needle may thus prove as consequential for the NBA,
MLB, NHL, and other sports associations as it is for the NFL. As the following
analysis explores, those associations would undoubtedly benefit from single
entity recognition, though it would arrive with potential complications.
A. NFL

As a respondent, the NFL would be an obvious beneficiary of the Court
affirming American Needle. In addition to obtaining immunity from section 1
scrutiny of NFLP's exclusive contract with Reebok, the NFL could obtain
immunity for other endeavors susceptible to section I challenges.
The NFL Network, an NFL-owned cable and satellite channel that
exclusively broadcasts a limited number of NFL games and related content, is
one such endeavor.211 The Network has been subject to much controversy,
most notably because it limits the viewership of televised games, charges cable
subscribers a relatively high price, and, until recently, was the subject of
litigation with Comcast over the channel's placement on basic cable or a
premium tier. 12
The Network lacks protection from the SBA, which applies only to
"[s]ponsored broadcasting," a "term of art which . . . [means only] free

possibility that a professional sports league could be considered a single entity under
Copperweld." (internal citation omitted)).
a11.

See Paolino, supra note 13, at 5-6, 28-29 (supplying details about the NFL Network, which is

212.

distributed through satellite providers and cable providers, normally as a premium-as
opposed to basic-channel and which broadcasts twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week, though of its 26,76o hours of annual programming, only eight live games, which
comprise roughly twenty-six hours of programming, are broadcast). Games broadcast on
the NFL Network are also broadcast in teams' local markets. See YOST, supra note 30, at 99.
See NFL Enters. LLC v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC, 841 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 2007);
see also James J. LaRocca, No Trust at the NFL: League's Network Passes Rule of Reason
Analysis, 1S UCLA ETrr. L. REv. 87, 88 (2008) (supplying a cogent background on the NFL
Network's revenue distribution); Richard Sandomir, Comcast and NFL Network Agree to
9-Year Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, May 20, 20o9, at B19 (discussing settlement of the dispute
between Comcast and the NFL Network).
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' As a result, the Network appears vulnerable to antitrust
network television."213
challenges. Some commentators assert that because NFL franchises use the
Network to restrict the televised availability of games and to impose prices for
viewing games that were previously available on free television, the Network
violates section 1.214 Interestingly, in March 2009, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter,
an ardent critic of the NFL, expressed apprehension that the NFL will use the
single entity defense to shelter the Network from potential section i scrutiny.2 15
To be fair, the Network might satisfy such scrutiny. By providing a national
broadcast (albeit on fee-based cable or satellite systems) of a game that would
otherwise be broadcast regionally, the Network arguably expands viewership.
As to concerns about consumer prices, games aired on the Network are
simultaneously broadcast on free television of the participating teams' local

markets.1 6 With single entity protection, however, these types of arguments

would be rendered unnecessary; the Network would be exempt from section 1
scrutiny.
Single entity recognition would also insulate the NFL and the NFLPA from
section 1 scrutiny of their exclusive contract with video game publisher
Electronic Arts, maker of the popular game Madden NFL. In 2004, Electronic

Arts reportedly paid $400 million for an exclusive five-year license to produce
games using NFL players, images, teams, logos, trademarks, and statistics. 7
The license, which was later extended to 2012,8 eliminates competition from

213. 133 CONG. REC. S13,220 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter).
214.

See, e.g., Paolino, supra note 13, at 28-29.

215.

Answers to Questionsfor the Record, Confirmation Hearingof ChristineA. Varney Before the S.
Comm. on the judiciary, ii1th Cong. (2009) (question from Sen. Specter, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://www.legaltimes.typepad.com/files/
specter-to-varney.pdf. But see Dave Zirin, The Senator from Comcast?: Arlen Specter and
SpyGate, POL. AFFAIRS, Mar. 4, 20o8, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/6559
(arguing that Senator Specter's views partly reflect contributions from Comcast).

216.

See Paolino, supra note 13, at 34-35. Fans living outside of those local markets who do not
pay for the Network cannot watch those games.

217.

A.H. Rajani, Note, Davidson & Associates v. Jung: (Re)interpreting Access Controls, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 367 (2000) (noting the $400 million figure); Troy

Wolverton, Electronic Arts Lands an NFL Exclusive, THESTREET.COM, Dec. 13,
2004, http://www.thestreet.com/story/o198835/electronic-arts-lands-an-nfl-exclusive.html
(supplying additional details of the exclusive contract between Electronic Arts, the NFL, and
the NFLPA).
218.

Bryan Intihar, EA Extends NFL Exclusivity Deal: Madden Remains the Only Game in Town
Through 2012, IUP.cOM, Feb. 12, 20o8, http://www.1up.com/do/newsStory?cld=3166155.
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Electronic Arts' rivals, including Sega, which had marketed a competing and
popular line of NFL video games at a significantly lower retail price.219
Although Electronic Arts' NFL games have sold well since 2004, they have
attracted criticism for lacking innovation.22 Prices for Madden NFL games have
also risen in the absence of competition from other NFL games.2"' Those and
other consequences underscore a central concern of section 1: an absence of
competition will lead to an inferior market." The exclusive Madden contract is
also the subject of Pecover v. Electronic Arts,223 a class action lawsuit recently
brought by disenchanted video game players. The suit contains a number of
claims, including those based on the Sherman Act.2" While neither the NFL
nor the NFLPA is a party to the litigation, their exclusive contract with
Electronic Arts could eventually face a section 1 challenge similar to the one
confronted by the NFL in American Needle. Plaintiffs in such a claim would
likely assert that interactive football video game software is a sufficiently
discrete product market -a proposition supported by the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California in Pecover." s With some level of
persuasion in light of the aforementioned data on prices and commentary on
innovation, the plaintiffs could also maintain that Electronic Arts's exclusive

219.

Blake Snow, Football Garners Sue EA over 'Anticompetitive' Madden, GAMEPRO, June 16, 2008,

220.

http ://www.gamepro.com/article/news/192688/football-gamers-sue-ea-over
-anticompetitive-madden.
Scott Jones, Madden NFL io, A.V. CLUB, Aug. 17, 2009, http://origin.avclub.conV
articles/madden-nfl-lo,3167o (criticizing John Madden Football games for appearing very

221.

222.

similar year-after-year); Anthony Palazzo, ElectronicArts Says 'Madden,' Industry Sales Drop
(Update 3), BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=2o6oio87&sid=aDZhBC6EPGa4 (discussing the disappointing sales of Madden
2010, which was released in August 2009, but noting that preceding years' versions of the
game sold well and industry sales on the whole were down).
See Snow, supra note 219 (noting how Electronic Arts dropped the price of Madden 2005
from $49.95 to $29.95 because of competition from NFL 2K5, which was priced at $19.95,
and also how in the absence of competition in the following year, Electronic Arts raised the
price of Madden 20o6 by seventy percent).
On the other hand, Electronic Arts could argue that it still competes with football games
that lack the NFL/NFLPA license and, more generally, with other video games and
entertainment products.

223.

Complaint, Pecover v. Elec. Arts Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. Co802820).

224.

225.

Id. at 7.
See Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 98o ("As the court understands these allegations, interactive
football software will not sell if it does not use the names, logos and other markers of teams
that actually compete in the NFL; . . . there are no substitutes for interactive football
software without the markers of actual teams and players.").
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contract for NFL video 6 games produces more anticompetitive injury than

procompetitive benefit.12

An American Needle holding in favor of the NFL would also impact the
upcoming collective bargaining discussions between the NFL and the NFLPA,
and possibly those between the NBA, MLB, and NHL and their respective
players' associations. In all four leagues, the respective Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs), which, inter alia, regulate mandatory subjects of
bargaining, are set to expire within the next two years. 27 While labor issues are
the context in which it is least likely that the Court would deem single entity
status appropriate for the NFL, any changes to the legal capacity of the NFL to
avoid section 1 scrutiny could alter the economic values of rights subject to
collective bargaining.
In their negotiations with the NFLPA, NFL owners are poised to demand
dramatic changes in player compensation. As currently configured, both the
salary cap and salary floor -the maximum and minimum number of dollars
teams must spend on player payroll-rise or fall commensurate with "total
revenue," a figure which, generally speaking, consists of all teams' shared and
unshared revenue1 18 As disparities in teams' unshared revenue have grown,
teams with relatively limited unshared revenue have been disadvantaged. 9
Owners are also troubled by the share of revenue enjoyed by NFL players, who
receive a higher percentage of revenue than is obtained by players in the NBA,
NHL, and MLB. 3 ° They are likewise distressed by the monetary value of

226.

227.

228.

See Liron Offir, Monopolistic Sleeper: How the Video Gaming Industry Awoke To Realize that
Electronic Arts Was Already in Charge, 8 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 91, 114-15 (2oo6) (arguing that

Electronic Arts's exclusive contracts would fail under rule of reason analysis).
The CBAs of the NFL and the NBA are set to expire in 2olo, while those of MLB and the
NHL are set to expire in 2ol. See Dave Sheinin, Fehr Resignsfrom Union, WASH. POST, June
23, 2009, at D5 (noting the expiration date of MLB's CBA); Amy Shipley, Economy Will
Force Failure of Franchises,Decrease in Salaries,Experts Say, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2009, at D5
(noting the expiration date of the NBA's CBA); Michael Whitmer, Players Talk About Talks:
Smith Holds Q&A About 2oio Season, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2009, Sports, at 4 (noting the
expiration date of the NFL's CBA); Steve Zipay, Briefs, NEWSDAY, Sept. 1,2009, at A48
(noting the expiration date of the NHL's CBA).
See Al Lackner, Salary Cap FAQ, ASKTHECOMMISH.COM, Jan. 19, 2009,
http://www.askthecommish.con/salarycap/faq.asp.

See Curnutte, supra note 73 ("[T]he problem with unshared revenue ... is that it all goes
into the league-wide tally that is used to determine the salary cap.").
230. See Liz Mullen, Prime Cut Goes to NFL Players, SPORTS Bus. J., Mar. 3, 20o8, at 1,availableat
http ://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/58252.
229.
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contracts secured by newly drafted players. 23' Although the current CBA
contains a rookie salary cap, rookie contracts can be structured in ways that
evade the spirit of that cap.232
While the NFLPA may acquiesce to a rookie wage scale, which would limit
drafted players' salaries according to their slot in the draft, it could cite
American Needle as a justification to resist other economic concessions.
Through single entity recognition, the NFL would obtain protection for
existing and new endeavors that would otherwise be subject to section 1
scrutiny. The NFLPA could thus characterize American Needle as supplying
NFL owners with a revenue windfall, a significant portion of which owners
need not share with players. A victory in American Needle for the NFL could
thus complicate and potentially hinder its forthcoming CBA negotiations.
B. NBA
Like the NFL, the NBA clearly supports the single entity defense, which
would insulate the NBA's exclusive licensing deals from section 1 scrutiny. 33
Single entity status may also benefit the NBA through curbed player salaries.
While the Seventh Circuit suggested that the single entity defense would be ill
suited for mandatory subjects of bargaining,23 4 the Supreme Court need not
embrace such a limitation. 3 The NBA would certainly relish the capacity to
unilaterally impose restrictions that concern mandatory subjects of bargaining.
The league, for instance, could adopt a salary scale that diminishes players' free

231.

See, e.g., Paul Domowitch, Rookie Wage Scale Talk May Affect

2oo9

NFL Draft,PHILA.
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Nov. 7, 2008, Sports, at 3.
Best illustrating this point, Matthew Stafford, the first overall pick of the 2009 NFL Draft,
signed a contract with the Detroit Lions that will pay him $41.7 million, the most
guaranteed dollars in the NFL. See Kevin Seifert, The Madness of the NFL's Rookie Pay Scale,
ESPN.coM, Apr. 24, 2009, http://myespn.go.com/blogs/nfcnorth/o-1o-137/The-madness
-of-the-NFL-s-rookie-pay-scale.html.
The NBA has filed an amicus brief supporting the NFL in American Needle. See Brief of
Amici Curiae Nat'l Basketball Ass'n & NBA Props. in Support of the NFL Respondents'
Response, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (No. o8-661),
2009 WL 164243.
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F. 3d 736, 741-42 (7 th Cir. 2008).

235.

The legal capacity to refrain from competing over players has motivated leagues to pursue

NEWS,

232.

233.

single entity status. MLS is one such league. See Martin Edel et al., Panel III: Restructuring
Professional Sports Leagues, 12 FORDHAM INTEU. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 435 (2002)

("So why did the MLS owners choose to form a single entity? They did it so that they could
claim an exemption from section i of the Sherman Act and not have to compete with each
other for their players. There is no other reason." (quoting prominent sports lawyer Jeffrey
Kessler)).
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agency and salary opportunities.23 6 Without single entity recognition, such a
scale would avoid section i scrutiny only if born from collective bargaining
with the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), which would
2 37
demand considerable concessions.
On the surface, the prospect of the NBA and the other major professional
sports leagues unilaterally imposing labor conditions may not seem worrisome.
After all, players in the NBA, NFL, MLB, and NHL typically receive salaries
that far exceed those enjoyed by most Americans,3' a fact that has drawn social
rebuke. 3 9 On the other hand, most players' careers are remarkably short, with
the average NBA and NFL careers lasting just four and a half years and three
and a half years, respectively, 4 ° and some player contracts lack salary
guarantees. 4' Players, moreover, are continuously exposed to occupational
health risks that can give rise to career-ending and permanently disabling

236. See Lester Munson, Antitrust Case Could Be Armageddon, ESPN.coM, July
237.

17,

2009,

http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=munson-lester&id=433626l.
The nonstatutory labor exemption furnishes antitrust immunity only for collectively
bargained terms which concern mandatory subjects and primarily affect the owners and
players. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-38 (1996). Attempts to curb player
salaries would also elicit resistance from players' agents who, while not a member of the
collective bargaining unit, are very influential. See Richard T. Karcher, Solving Problems in
the Player Representation Business: Unions Should Be the "Exclusive" Representatives of the
Players,42 WILLAmETTE L. REv. 737, 739-43 (2006).

238.

Consider the following average salaries: $5.2 million in the NBA; $2.8 million in the MLB;
$2.2 million in the NHL; and $1.8 million in the NFL. See Gary Loewen, Shoot the Puck
Already Kaberle, TORONTO SUN, Nov. 11, 2008, at S7. Median salaries are similarly
impressive. In the NBA, for instance, the median salary is $2.75 million, while the NFL
median salary is $77o,ooo. See Scott Ferrell, Show Him the Money, TIMEs (Shreveport, La.),
Sept. 1, 2oo8, Sports, at 1 (noting the median NFL salary); Jesse Noyes, Celtics' Big
Three Hold Court in Salary Levels, BOSTON Bus. J., Dec. 26, 20o8,
http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2008/12/29/story6.html (noting the median
NBA salary).

239. See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Sports TV's Big-Money Brawl, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2003, at El

(describing professional athletes' salaries as "ridiculous"); Transcripts: American Morning:
Intelligence Reform
Winners,
Losers;
Influenza
Fears
(Dec.
8, 2o04),
http://transcripts.cnn.comi/TRANSCRIPTS/o412/o8/ltm.o6.html ("Let's see all of the
professional athletes play one complete season for the same salary as a high school teacher or
a city firefighter.").
240. See Athelia Knight, Pursuing a Career at a Young Age; Opinion Divided When Non-Seniors
Enter Draft, WASH. POST, June 27, 1995, at C1 (noting the length of an average NBA career);
Eriq Gardner, Rookie Abuse, SLATE, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2216797 (noting

the length of an average NFL career).
241. This is particularly true in the NFL, where contracts are largely comprised of nonguaranteed
income. See Scott Hollander, Note, Super Bowl Hero to Bank Account Zero, 26 CARDOZO ARTS
&ENT. L.J. 899, 924 (2009).
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injuries. This is particularly true in the NFL, which has drawn scrutiny for the
prevalence of neurological injuries manifesting in retired players 42 and for the
limitations of its collectively bargained pension and disability policies?4 3 The
NBA, for its part, has attracted criticism for its disregard for players'
individualism, such as players' rights to choose attire for off-court events,' 1
and players' privacy interests. Perhaps most notably, in 2005, the Chicago Bulls
went so far as to condition the signing of a player's contract on the player
subjecting himself to genetic testing."' Should leagues receive the capacity to
unilaterally impose labor conditions, the players' capacity to bargain for salary
and employment protections would surely be diminished.
The NBA could also attempt to use the single entity defense to institute an
elevated age eligibility restriction. The league's existing restriction, as
collectively bargained and as premised on debatable rationales related to
maturity and player development, 4 6 requires that an amateur player of U.S.
origin be at least nineteen years old on December 31 of the year of the NBA
draft and that at least one NBA season must have passed between when the
player graduated from high school, or when he would have graduated from
high school, and the NBA draft.4 7 The NBA would like to elevate the age

cutoff to at least twenty years of age, a proposition resisted by the NBPA4

s

If,

See Alan Schwarz, 12 Athletes Leaving Brains to Researchers, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 24, 2008, at Di.
243. See generally Brett Edwin LoVellette, Comment, "Mortal [K]ombat in Cleats": An
Examination of the Effectiveness of the National Football League's DisabilityPlan and Its Impact
on Retired Players, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1101 (2009) (describing limitations of disability and
retirement policies for retired NFL players). By squandering their earnings, many players
compound the challenges presented by insufficient pension and disability plans. See Pablo S.
Torre, How (and Why) Athletes Go Broke, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 23, 2009, at 90, 92
(noting that "[b]y the time they have been retired for two years, 78% of former NFL players
have gone broke or are under financial stress" and "[w]ithin five years of retirement, an
estimated 6o% of former NBA players are broke"); see also Shira Springer, For Walker,
FinancialFoulsMount, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 2009, at Ai (discussing former Boston Celtic
Antoine Walker losing nearly all of the $i1o million he earned as an NBA player).
244. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination,40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895
(2007) (discussing and criticizing the NBA dress code).
245. See Michael A. McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion:A SituationalAnalysis of the NBA
and Diminishing PlayerAutonomy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 819, 848-49 (2006). The Bulls
believed the player, Eddy Curry, suffered from hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (he did not).
Curry refused to take the test and was subsequently traded to the New York Knicks. Id. at
242.

849.
246.

Id. at 832-45.

247.

See

NAT'L BASKETBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

art. X, S 1(b)(i)

(2005), availableat http://www.nbpa.com/cba-articles/article-X.php.
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See Howard Beck, From Preps to the Pinnacle of the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, May 28,

2009,

at B1 5 .

119--726

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

2010

however, the Court holds that the single entity defense extends to mandatory
subjects of bargaining, the NBA could unilaterally and without fear of section 1
scrutiny modify the eligibility rule, perhaps even requiring players to complete
four years of college to be eligible.
Single entity status may not, however, entirely benefit the NBA,
particularly if NBA China were classified as part of the NBA for purposes of
intellectual property. NBA China is a new entity owned primarily by the NBA,
with minority interests held by ESPN and several financial institutions. 4 9
China is the NBA's largest market outside of the United States and the NBA
hopes that NBA China will generate significant revenue."'
NBA players could be entitled to a portion of the revenue generated by
NBA China. Under the NBA's CBA, players are entitled to a fixed percentage of
the "basketball related income" (BRI) of all NBA teams." ' BRI expansively
includes income received by the NBA, NBA Properties, and NBA Media
Ventures, but not "proceeds from the grant of expansion teams" or player
fines. " ' The CBA does not contemplate NBA China. If NBA China and the
NBA were a single entity, the players would have a stronger basis for receipt of
the revenue.
The issue of single entity status for the NBA is made more intriguing still
by the rise of international basketball opportunities that, in terms of monetary
compensation, are increasingly akin to those in the NBA." In fact, several U.S.
players have signed with European teams instead of NBA teams. 4 There is
also speculation that European teams, which are not bound by salary caps, will

http://www.nba.coni/
news/nba china o8o114.html; see also Adam Thompson & Alan Paul, NBA Uses Local Allure
To Push Planned League in China, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2008, at Bi (providing additional
detail on NBA China).
Michael Lee, The NBA in China: Opening a Super Market, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2007, at El.
See NAT'L BASKETBALL LEAGUE, supra note 247, art. VII, § 2(a)(1), available at
http://www.nbpa.com/cba-articles/article-VI.php; see also THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 203-04
(Scott R Rosner & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 2004) (supplying background on BRI);
Larry Coon's NBA Salary Cap FAQ http://members.cox.net/lmcoon/salarycap.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2009) (listing forms of revenue classified as BRA).

249. NBA Announces Formation of NBA China, NBA.coM, Jan. 14, 2008,

250.
251.

252.

See Larry Coon's NBA Salary Cap FAQsupra note 251.

253.

See, e.g., Pete Thamel, A Top ProspectPicks Europe over High School and College, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 23, 2009, at B14.
z54. See Sekou Smith, Childress Headed Back to Greece, ATLANTA
(mentioning Josh Childress and Jannero Pargo).

J.-CONST., July

15,

2009,

at Ci
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eventually compete for such superstar U.S. players as LeBron James and Kobe
Bryant."'
To the extent the NBA competes with bona fide rival leagues, the NBA and
its teams would presumably be more inclined to share a corporate
consciousness. For that reason, the NBA may be better positioned for single
entity recognition than the unrivaled NFL.2s6 Such a deduction takes on added
legal significance when considering Fraser, where the First Circuit, while
ultimately rejecting MILS as a single entity, deemed MLS to embody some of
the characteristics of a single entity," including the ability of MLS players to
obtain comparable or superior employment conditions in other leagues." 8
C. MLB

An affirmation in American Needle could also benefit MLB, which already
enjoys a limited exemption from federal antitrust law.25 9 The exemption,

255.
256.

257.

See Marc J. Spears, Europe Can Reach for Stars: Top NBA Talent May Be Lured over, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 1o, 2008, at C6.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of competition for the
NFL).
See supra Section I.D.; see also MASTERALEXIS ET AL., supra note 201, at 208 (discussing the
court's unwillingness to use the phrase "single entity" despite in some ways describing MLS
as such); cf. D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving
Antitrust

Agency

Capacity,

103

Nw.

U.

L.

REv.

COLLOQY

242

(20o8),

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2oo8/46/LRCo1120o8n46Sokol.pdf
(discussing the increased role for antitrust law in regulating international business
activities).
258. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Heike K.

Sullivan, Comment, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The MLS's Single-Entity Structure Is a
"Sham," 73 TEMP. L. REv. 865, 902 (2000) (discussing the superior salary opportunities for
soccer players in Europe).
259. MLB enjoyed an expansive exemption from antitrust laws following FederalBaseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The
exemption attracted much criticism. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, ioi YALE L.J. 331, 400-01 (1991) (noting the
incoherence of MLB, but not other leagues, enjoying exemption from antitrust laws). In
1998, MLB's limited exemption was narrowed by the Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. S 26b
(2oo6). The Act eliminated the antitrust immunity enjoyed by MLB for matters related to
the labor of Major League Baseball players, such as those matters impacting mandatory
subjects of bargaining. See J. Gordon Hylton, Why Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Still
Survives, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 391, 391 (1999) (noting that the Curt Flood Act eliminated

antitrust immunity for certain labor issues); see also Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt
Flood Act of 1998, 87 NEB. L. REV. 747, 751-55 (2009) (discussing the impact of the narrowing
of the exemption); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Affirmative Injunctions in Athletic Employment
Contracts:Rethinking the Place of the Lumley Rule in American Sports Law, 16 MARQ SPORTS
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however, does not extend to mandatory subjects of bargaining and may not
extend to licensing and other matters, meaning an affirmation in American
Needle could still prove consequential. 6' Even before its final disposition,
American Needle appears to have emboldened MLB. In August 2008, MLB and
Topps announced that Topps, a trading card company, will become the sole
licensed producer of MLB baseball cards.26' The contract, which MLB believes
is consistent with American Needle, will preclude other trading card companies,
including Topps' primary rival, Upper Deck, from utilizing MLB's trademarks
and logos. 6
MLB might also avail itself of the single entity defense to ameliorate the
lingering embarrassment associated with the steroids scandal and to diminish
the possibility of a similar scandal recurring. While the scope of the scandal
remains unknown, many MLB players used illegal steroids and other
prohibited performance-enhancers from the mid-199os until well into the
current decade.263 The scandal has tarnished records and attracted
congressional rebuke, among other deleterious consequences.26 4
Propelling the scandal is a purportedly confidential list of 104 names of
players who tested positive for steroids in 2003. Pursuant to an agreement
between MLLB and the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA),
the players, who were tested as part of a sample test, were assured their names
would be kept confidential and that any implicating materials would be

L. REV. 261, 278-79 (20o6) (discussing Flood's efforts to challenge MLB's supremacy over
labor). The Act did not expressly limit MLB's antitrust immunity in other ways, though
there remains uncertainty as to whether courts might expansively construe the Act. See Marc
Edelman, Can Antitrust Law Save the Minnesota Twins? Why Commissioner Selig's Contraction
Plan Was Never a Sure Deal, lo SPORTS LAW. J. 45, 54 (2003).
26o. See Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 26b(b).

261. See Richard Sandomir, Topps Gets Exclusive Deal with Baseball, Landing a Blow to Upper Deck,

N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 6, 2009, at B16.
262. Id. (citing comments by Tim Brosnan, Executive Vice President for Business at Major
League Baseball).
263. See Tiffany D. Lipscomb, Note, Can Congress Squeeze the "Juice"Out of Professional Sports?

The Constitutionalityof CongressionalIntervention into Professional Sports' Steroid Controversy,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 303-o8 (2oo8).
264. See, e.g., Letter from Tom Davis, U.S. Rep. & Henry Waxman, U.S. Rep., to Allan Selig,

Comm'r of MLB & Donald Fehr, Executive Dir. of MLBPA (Mar. 16, 2005), available at
http://bob.sabrwebs.conqcontent/steroidhearings/SeligFehrLetter.pdf (characterizing the
lack of effective drug testing as a source of shame for both MLB and the Major League
Baseball Players Association).
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destroyed immediately.26 The names were accidentally left on a computer
seized by the Justice Department. The list has been sealed pursuant to a court
order, 266 but the names of seven players-most notably, Alex Rodriguez,
Sammy Sosa, Manny Ramirez, and David Ortiz-were leaked in 2009, and
much speculation persists as to the identities of the remaining ninety-seven
267
names.
While the court order, as well as fiduciary duty, precludes the MLBPA from
releasing the remainder of the list,26 8 MLB, which is not subject to the court
order, may be able to divulge it. MLB Commissioner Bud Selig could maintain
that the "best interests of the game" power, as vaguely contained in MLB's
constitution (a document originally drafted in 1921, and most recently updated
in June 2005, that was not collectively bargained), 69 accords him sufficient
authority. On the other hand, courts have limited the scope of that authority"7 0

and the CBA itself contains confining language, particularly with regard to
mandatory subjects of bargaining like drug testing. 71 In the unlikely scenario

26s.

266.

267.

268.

See Michael McCann, Will Steroids Report Lead to Perjury Investigation of Sammy Sosa?,
SI.coM, June 16, 2009, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2oo9/writers/michaelmccann/
o6/16/sammy.sosa.
See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F. 3 d lO85, lo9o n.4 (9 th Cit.
2008) (noting that the players' names are under seal). In August 2009, the Ninth Circuit
held that federal agents lacked the legal authority to obtain the list of 104 names. See United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. o5-1oo67, 05-15006, 05-55354, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19119 (9 th Cir. Aug. 26, 2009). The decision suggests that absent further leaks,
the list will remain sealed and confidential. See Michael McCann, Remaining Names on Drug
List Likely To Remain Under Seal Indefinitely, SI.coM, Aug. 26, 2009,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2oo9/writers/michael-mccann/o8/26/mlb.drug.list.ruling.
See, e.g., Bob Ryan, Ortiz's Positive Test Latest Sorry Chapter,BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 20o9, at
Ci.
See McCann, supra note 266.
art. I, § 2 (2005), available at http://www.bizofbaseball.com/
docs/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf ("The functions of the Commissioner shall
include: . . .(b) To investigate . . .any act, transaction, or practice charged, alleged, or
suspected to be detrimental to the best interests of the national game of Baseball, with
authority to summon persons and to order the production of documents; and... to impose
").
such penalties ....
See Craig F. Arcella, Note, Major League Baseball's Disempowered Commissioner: Judicial
Ramifications of the 1994 Restructuring,97 COLUM. L. REv. 2420, 2429-30, 2438 (1997).
The CBA expressly characterizes itself as the primary document for the terms and conditions
of MLB players' employment. See 2007-2011 MLB BAsIc AGREEMENT art. 1 (20o6), available
at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf ("The intent and purpose of the
Clubs and the Association ...in entering into this Agreement is to set forth their agreement
on certain terms and conditions of employment of all Major League Baseball Players for the
duration of this Agreement.").

269. See MAJOR LEAGUE CONST.

270.
271.
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that the single entity defense extends to mandatory subjects of bargaining or at
least to testing, however, Selig would likely have the authority to release the
list. Though less likely given the presence of the CBA, Selig may also obtain the
requisite authority should the defense extend to matters which damage the
integrity of the game.
MLB could similarly employ single entity status to unilaterally impose
more stringent drug testing than has been yielded through collective
bargaining. Current testing protocols do not test for human growth hormone,
a banned performance enhancer which has been linked to players.272
Additionally, various commentaries have warned about the development of
new steroids that will evade collectively bargained testing procedures.2 73 Since
testing implicates mandatory subjects of bargaining, MLB would only obtain
the capacity to unilaterally impose new testing protocols if the Court defined
single entity status as at least partially inclusive of those subjects.
D. NHL
The NHL would likewise gain from single entity status, particularly in
reining in maverick owners. On the heels of settling a section 1 litigation
brought by the New York Rangers over league control of teams' websites,274
the NHL finds itself fending off a section 1 claim brought by the Phoenix
Coyotes franchise. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC2 71 centers on the NHL
preventing the Coyotes from being sold through a bankruptcy proceeding. The
league has nixed the Coyotes' attempt, reasoning that, pursuant to the league's
constitution (which each of the thirty teams has ratified), a team can only be
purchased if the NHL's Board of Governors, which consists of one

272.

See Holli N. Heiles, Comment, Baseball's "Growth" Problem: Can Congress Require Major
League Baseball To Test Its Athletes for Human Growth Hormone? A Proposal, 62 ARK. L. REV.
315, 326-28 (2009).

273. See, e.g., Karen Kaplan & Denise Gellene, As Testing Gets Better, Dopers Get More Clever, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2007, at A23.
274.

Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455 (LAP), 2008 WL
4547518 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1O, 2008). Madison Square Garden concerned a lawsuit brought by an
NHL team against the NHL. The New York Rangers claimed that the NHL violated section
1 by prohibiting the Rangers from operating the team's website. The parties settled their
dispute in March 2009, with the NHL largely preserving website control. See Stipulation
and Order of Dismissal, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 07 CD 8455
(LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2009); see also Tripp Mickle & Eric Fisher, NHL and MSG
Winding Down Fight over Web, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at i
(discussing the settlement).

275.

4o6 B.R. 30 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009).

AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL

representative from each team, approves the transaction.27 6 The Board has
refused to approve the sale of the team to the Coyotes' preferred buyer. It
appears instead that the NHL will attempt to buy the Coyotes, a transaction
which would require approval by a federal bankruptcy judge and would also
end the litigation between the parties. 7' The league would then attempt to
8
identify an acceptable buyer.7

In arguing that the Coyotes "cannot state an antitrust claim against the
NHL," the league notably stresses American Needle:
[T]he League is a single economic entity that is incapable of conspiring
with itself.... The Seventh Circuit recently applied this "single entity"
doctrine to the National Football League, finding that when the thirtytwo NFL teams get together to make decisions regarding how to
produce, market, and sell their jointly created product called NFL
football, they are acting as a single economic entity and are incapable of
conspiring in violation of the antitrust laws. See American Needle, Inc. v.
NFL ....

The same principle applies to the NHL when its Board of

Governors makes decisions regarding how and where to produce their
product and who should be admitted to join the venture. 7 9
The NHL's use of American Needle as persuasive authority is unsurprising
and reveals the potential magnitude of the Supreme Court's forthcoming
decision. 8, Should the Court affirm the Seventh Circuit's holding, American
Needle could become the leading authority for leagues when confronted with
legal challenges to their autonomy.

27.

Id.
See Carrie Watters, Coyotes Owner Agrees To Sell Team to NHL,
2009, at 1.

278.

Id.

276.

ARiz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 27,

National Hockey League's Motion To Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment
at 3, In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, 406 B.R. 30, (No. 2:o9-bk-o 94 88-RTBP) (emphasis
altered).
28o. The NHL may have been particularly motivated to use American Needle in light of its
experience in Madison Square Garden. During the litigation, a federal district court declined
to endorse the NHL's single entity defense, reasoning that the NHL had failed to plead
sufficient information. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League, No. 07 CV
8455 (LAP), 2008 WL 4547518, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1o, 2008).
279.
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E. NCAA
The NCAA is less likely to receive single entity status than professional
sports leagues, since, inter alia, it is already the recipient of an adverse Supreme
Court ruling in Board of Regents and is structurally different from a professional
sports league and its independently owned teams.28 ' If, however, the Court in
American Needle endorses the single entity defense in language sufficiently
broad so as to encompass the NCAA, the NCAA would certainly welcome
single entity recognition,28, which, in the context of regulating the NCAA
Men's Basketball Tournament, it unsuccessfully pursued in Metropolitan
IntercollegiateBasketballAss'n v. NCAA. 83

Like the NFL, the NCAA has agreed to an exclusive licensing contract with
Electronic Arts, which publishes the video game NCAA Football. As a single
entity, the NCAA's exclusive deal with Electronic Arts would gain an
exemption from section 1. The NCAA could likewise deploy single entity status
to thwart a section i claim recently brought by former UCLA star basketball
player Ed O'Bannon on behalf of a class of thousands of other former men's
basketball and football players. 84 In O'Bannon v. NCAA, the NCAA is alleged
to have violated section 1, among other sources of law, by profiting from use of
the images and likenesses of former NCAA student-athletes and by preventing
those persons from negotiating their own licensing deals with television
networks, video game companies, and various businesses that receive NCAA
licenses."' The section i claim supposes that if student-athletes could negotiate
their own licensing deals after leaving college, more licenses would be sold and
that, in turn, would generate a more competitive marketplace. 8 6 As a single
entity, the NCAA would defeat O'Bannon's section 1 claim, since the NCAA
would not be subject to section i.

z81. See supra Section I.D.
282.

Alternatively, American Needle could confer single entity status to college conferences, but
not the NCAA. For an article advocating that result, see Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory,
College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking: A New Critique of the NCAA 's Amateurism Rules, 6
VA. SPORTS &ENT. L.J. 51 (2006).

283. 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
284.

Class Action Complaint, O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 09-CV-3329
(N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009).

285.

Id.; see also Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Anti-Trust
Case, SI.COM, July 22, 2009, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2oog/writers/nichael
_mccann/o7/21/ncaa (explaining the lawsuit).

a86. See McCann, supra note 285.
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Single entity recognition would nonetheless come with a potential cost for
the NCAA. In light of the commercialization of college sports, some
commentators have questioned the authenticity of the NCAA's student-athlete
mission, just as they have objected to the NCAA's tax-exempt status as an
educational institution."7 To the extent American Needle links the NCAA with
professional sports leagues, calls for Congress to reconsider the NCAA's
favorable legal treatment may gain momentum.
IV.A RECOMMENDATION

TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court correctly granted certiorari in American Needle. First,
and most practically, there now exists a circuit split on the single entity defense
for sports leagues and the split may spawn undesirable incentives for forum
shopping. Second, the Seventh Circuit's opinion largely omits guidance as to
the availability of the single entity defense for other entities, be they sports
leagues or other types of businesses, which might attempt to draw parallels to
the NFL. Third, the Seventh Circuit's opinion may be inconsistent with the
Court's holdings in Copperweld, Board of Regents, and other decisions.81
The Court should reject a general availability of the single entity defense for
professional sports leagues. Those leagues, however, should retain an
opportunity to obtain exemption from section i in limited and carefully defined
circumstances.
The suggested rejection is mainly premised on the absence of legal
authority. Although legal scholars have, with some persuasiveness,
championed economic rationales and logical arguments for characterizing
leagues as single entities, such recognition would be flatly inconsistent with
Copperweld and the views of most, if not all, federal circuits. Also, while it is
true that leagues, as complete single entities or as predominantly single
entities, would remain subject to other sources of antitrust law, the mere
presence of those other sources would not justify exemption from the most

287. See W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a Nonprofit
Organization To Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REV. 851, 919 (2002) (opining that

NCAA institutions have "abandoned [an] earlier strong commitment to amateurism" and
that commercialization has become a primary goal); John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax
Exemption and College Athletics, 2OO U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/
so13/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1336727 (discussing criticisms of the NCAA's tax exempt
status).

288. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 n.1 (2oo6) (suggesting that the decision to
eliminate competition through joint venture behavior would be subject to section i
scrutiny).
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important source-section 1. Indeed, single entity leagues could impose
restraints on the salary and employment autonomy of players and coaches and,
more generally, endanger the legacy of league-labor relations. In addition,
leagues are composed of often combative factions with unaligned economic
interests. The notion that behind a warring image rests a core of shared
consciousness seems quixotic, if not altogether fanciful.
The more challenging question for the Court is whether professional sports
leagues can constitute a single entity for any purpose. In American Needle, the
Seventh Circuit concluded the NFL could constitute a single entity for
intellectual property licensing, though as explained in Part II, the court reached
its conclusion through questionable logic.
A literal application of Copperweld would suggest that leagues cannot
behave as single entities. After all, teams, unlike parents and subsidiaries, can
in theory compete over any business practice. Their choice to collaborate
instead could procure anticompetitive outcomes that defy section 1, such as
increased prices or diminished choices.
Then again, as Justice Breyer opined in Brown, competing teams can only
survive through some level of economic cooperation.289 The two propositions
are reconcilable: while teams could in theory compete in any business practice,
they could not compete in every business practice. Indeed, without any
economic collaboration, teams would be unable to partake in a league; without
significant collaboration, teams might forgo opportunities that maximize
competition and control costs, thereby leaving fans with a diminished product
and a depleted market.
Identifying where courts should permit teams to collaborate presents a
challenge. One response would be to preserve the status quo, with restraints, as
consummated by teams in a joint venture, subject to section 1 and rule of
reason. This response would encourage the Supreme Court to reverse the
Seventh Circuit's holding and remand American Needle for rule of reason
analysis. The status quo would ensure that restraints comply with section 1,
and, as noted in Part II, a restraint such as the one found in American Needle
would likely survive rule of reason analysis.
As a fact-intensive model, however, rule of reason increases the possibility
of litigation for matters that may be more correctly handled by the single entity
defense. Indeed, certain collaborations between teams may not pose the
anticompetitive risks that the Sherman Act was enacted to combat and may not
rob the market of the independent sources of economic power that competition
necessitates. To the contrary, certain collaborations may promote competition.

28g.

See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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This theme has been recognized by courts when applying Copperweld to other
business contexts.29 In the sports context, the prospect for such collaborations
would seem amplified by the globalization of professional sports. As certain
U.S. sports leagues, such as the NBA and the NHL, increasingly compete with
professional leagues located in other countries, concerns about anticompetitive
risks will diminish.
A different response from the status quo would be to assign single entity
status to specific areas of collaboration that do not pose section 1 concerns.
Reconsider Copperweld's shared-consciousness analogy between a driver and
his or her horses: "a multiple team of horses drawls] a vehicle under the
control of a single driver."29' With regard to television rights, for instance,
Congress and President Kennedy, through the SBA, implicitly regarded the
NFL and its teams as the driver and horses, respectively. In hindsight, their
reasoning, which conflicted with that of the federal courts, appears correct. The
SBA markedly expanded viewing opportunities for sports fans and enabled the
NFL, and to a lesser extent the NBA, MLB, and NHL, to effect necessary
revenue parity.
If professional sports leagues and their independently owned franchises
should gain issue-specific exemptions from section 1, the question then
becomes, which branch of government is best positioned to grant such
exemptions: the judicial branch or the legislative branch? Courts have
undoubtedly struggled to develop a precedential framework for single entity
recognition of sports leagues. While they can easily identify the driver and
horses, courts seem to lack the necessary instruments to discern when the
horses are, or could be, unhitched or uncooperative.
It may thus be inadvisable for courts to develop a "test" for single entity
recognition of professional sports leagues. Instead, Congress, with its
enhanced resources and more deliberative process, could better examine the
appropriateness of targeted exemptions from section 1.'9' Such an approach
would avoid the ambiguities of single entity application to professional sports
leagues while retaining, when desired, rule of reason scrutiny of league
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restraints. The approach would also comport with a history of legislative
exemptions from federal antitrust laws.2 93
The Court deferring to Congress would, however, subject potential
exemptions to the federal legislative process, hardly a flawless or egalitarian
undertaking.29 4 The leagues, which utilize a vast network of government
relations specialists, influential lobbyists, and political action committees, are
well-positioned to exert disproportionate influence on congressional
decisionmaking 9 s Some commentators opine that leagues have a history of
Capitol Hill arm-twisting, with passage of the SBA, which was reportedly
facilitated by adroit lobbying, as most illustrative.29 6 Other businesses,
moreover, would likely encourage such lobbying, if not deploy their own
lobbyists to advocate on the leagues' behalf, since exemptions for leagues may
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See STEPHEN R. LOwE, THE KID ON THE SANDLOT: CONGRESS AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS,
1910-1992, at 92-93 (1995); see also Robert Holo & Jonathan Talansky, Taxing the Business of
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eventually lend credence to exemptions for those businesses.2 97 Before a federal
court, in contrast, leagues and other businesses would lack the capacity to
lobby the decisionmakers and their legal arguments would presumably be
resolved on the merits.
Of similar concern, other industries saddled by section 1 may view
legislative exemptions for professional sports leagues as justifying additional
exemptions. Indeed, should Congress extend targeted exemptions to
professional leagues, various industries could aggressively lobby Congress for
similarly favorable treatment. If a "slippery slope" of exemptions arises, section
1 could encounter a bevy of exceptions that threaten its primary goals.29 8
A legislative approach to examining the merits of the single entity status of
leagues may thus prove far from perfect. Yet in a choice between Congress and
the courts, Congress appears superiorly situated. Courts have struggled to
assess potential exemptions for professional sports leagues, whereas Congress,
with its institutional advantages, has established a more capable record. In
addition, while concerns about lobbying by professional sports leagues and
other industries are well-founded, various groups, such as players' associations
and businesses likely to be shut out by exclusive contracts, would be poised to
effectively lobby againstsweeping changes in section i's application.
Recognizing the longstanding difficulty of judicially reconciling the unique
structure of professional sports leagues with broadly applicable antitrust law,
the Supreme Court should reverse American Needle and encourage Congress to
engage its ultimate authority over statutory antitrust law.

297.
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